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The Supreme Court's controversial decision in Citizens United, much like
its previous decision in Bellotti, was based in part on the notion that dissenting
shareholders are sufficiently protected by state corporate law and the priority
it accords to shareholder interests. There has been much debate in recent years
over whether the Court's reasoning was sound. Absent from this conversation
is any discussion of the interests of non-shareholders, uch as employees and
creditors, even as their importance to the corporation has become increasingly
recognized in recent years.
The courts have never considered the problem of dissenting non-
shareholders in assessing regulatory restrictions on corporate political
activity. This Article argues that they should. It is the first to explore the
potential agency costs that corporate political activity creates for non-
shareholders, and in so doing, it lays out two main arguments. First, these
agency costs may be significant, as I illustrate through several case studies.
Second, neither corporate law nor private ordering provides solutions to this
agency problem. Indeed, because the theoretical arguments for shareholder
primacy in corporate law are largely inapplicable for corporate political
activity, corporate law may actually serve to exacerbate the agency problems
that such activity creates for non-shareholders. Private ordering, which could
take the form of contractual covenants restricting corporate political activity,
also seems unlikely to solve this problem, due to the large economic frictions
facing such covenants.
These findings have potentially significant ramifications for the Court's
corporate political speech jurisprudence, particularly as laid out in Bellotti
and Citizens United. One logical conclusion is that these decisions, regardless
of their constitutional merit, make for very bad public policy, insofar as they
preempt much-needed regulatory solutions for reducing non-shareholder
agency costs, and thus may have the effect of inhibiting efficient corporate
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ordering and capital formation. Another outgrowth of this analysis is that non-
shareholder agency costs may provide an important rationale for government
regulation of corporate political activity.
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Introduction
This Article explores the potential agency costs created by corporate political
activity (CPA) for non-equity stakeholders in the public corporation. There has
been a significant and growing body of work focusing on shareholder agency costs
arising from CPA,' particularly since the Supreme Court's controversial decision in
1. Consistent with much of the literature on agency problems arising from corporate
attempts to influence political or regulatory actors, I use the term "corporate political activity" or "CPA"
in a very broad sense, "to encompass any corporate activity intended to influence the political process
and/or political decision making, i.e., elections for political or judicial office, law-making (both
legislative and regulatory), or simply adding to the political discourse on issues of public concern." Jay
Kesten, Democratizing Corporate Political Activity, 10 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 161, 163 n.1 (2016). See
also Sean Lux et al., Mixing Business With Politics. A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Outcomes
of Corporate Political Activity, 37 J. MGMT. 223, 223-24 (2011) (citing Amy J. Hillman et al.,
Corporate Political Activity. A Review and Research Agenda, 30 J. MGMT. 837 (2004) (defining CPA in
a similar way)). This includes direct contributions to political candidates (which are outlawed under the
Tillman Act of 1907), independent political expenditures (which were the subject of the campaign
finance laws at issue in Citizens United), contributions to political parties, contributions to PACs,
contributions to Super PACs, contributions to trade groups and advocacy groups, advertising meant to
move public policy, the hiring of former political officials, as well as expenditures related to lobbying.
See Kesten, supra; see also ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & DOUGLAS DOWSON, MANHATTAN INST. CTR. FOR
PUB. POLICY, CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING: WHY THE NEW CRITICS ARE WRONG (2012); Lucian
A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech. Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV.
83, 93-97 (2010) (using a broad, if undefined, view of "corporate political speech," which includes all
"lobbying and political expenditures," donations to trade groups and non-profit advocacy organizations
such as the Chamber of Commerce, and funds spent on sponsoring and promoting corporate political
action committees, to analyze the shareholder agency costs of CPA); John C. Coates, IV, Corporate
Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 657, 660-
665 (2012) (using a broad definition of "corporate political activity" to analyze shareholder agency
costs); Timothy Werner & John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent Expenditures, and Agency
Costs. Reexamining the Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 127,
129-130 (2014) (using a similarly broad definition of "corporate political activity" in looking at the
conflicts between shareholders and managers). While much of the CPA agency cost literature has
focused on corporate political expenditures, either through PACs or independent expenditures, corporate
lobbying may actually be far more important in influencing the passage, implementation, and
interpretation of laws and regulations. See Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political
Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and Executives 2, 7-9 (July 10, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 2313232 (noting that corporate
lobbying expenditures have historically eclipsed PAC contributions by a ratio of more than ten to one,
and that corporate lobbying accounted for at least 68% of federal lobbying expenditures in 2010).
Lobbying is typically understood to be complementary to corporate political expenditures, and a firm
that engages in one type of CPA typically engages in several types of CPA. Id. The campaign finance
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Citizens United, which rejected governmental restrictions on corporate independent
expenditures based on First Amendment grounds.2 The majority opinion in Citizens
United, echoing the Court's previous reasoning in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,3 supported the general proposition that the protection of shareholder
interests against potential agency conflicts could be an appropriate basis for
regulating corporate political speech, but held that existing "procedures of
corporate democracy" found in state corporate law were already sufficient to
address any such concerns.4 A flood of theoretical and empirical research, both
before and particularly after Citizens United, has sought to provide insight into
whether corporate law adequately addresses the problem of shareholder agency
costs that might arise from CPA.
The agency cost framework, which looks at the potential divergence of interests
between managers and outside owners of the corporation has long been a central
focus of corporate law, and thus has been a primary lens through which corporate
law scholars have studied CPA. But it is important to recognize that CPA has
always been considered from the perspective of shareholders. This is true not only
of the Supreme Court, which has had a long history of equating corporations with
their shareholders, but also of corporate law scholarship. But while the question of
shareholder agency costs arising from CPA has been (and continues to be) well
covered, there has been no such analysis of the potential agency costs faced by non-
shareholders, despite the existence of a fairly deep literature that explores the
agency costs faced by non-shareholders generally in corporate governance. The
failure to consider the agency conflicts created by CPA for non-shareholders is an
enormous oversight, given the outsized role that non-equity inputs play in the
success of a typical corporation. For example, debt investors provide a huge source
of financing for corporations, particularly large publicly traded corporations. Non-
literature has tended to focus on specific subsets of CPA, including corporate campaign contributions
and corporate political expenditures. This is in part because the Court's jurisprudence in this area has
largely focused on the anti-distortion and anti-corruption rationales for regulating CPA, and these
rationales justify a far narrower scope of regulation, limited to those forms of corporate political speech
that may be seen as having undue influence or a corruptive effect. See Alan J. Meese, Limitations on
Corporate Speech. Protection for Shareholders or Abridgement of Expression?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 305, 307 (1993). But focusing on the agency problems faced by shareholders and other investors,
as the shareholder protection rationale does, justifies a far broader sweep of regulatory restrictions-as
Meese has stated, such a rationale "will support the restriction of any corporate speech," whether or not
such activity may have an unduly distortive effect or promote corruption. Id. Thus, a broad definition of
CPA is appropriate for this Article for two reasons: first, because any type of CPA raises the potential
problem of agency conflicts within the firm; and second, because, from the perspective of corporate
stakeholders, findings made as to one type of CPA may illustrate more broadly the problems with other
types of CPA as well.
2. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. 435 U.S. 765, 794-795 (1978) (stating that "the procedures of corporate
democracy," including shareholders' "power to elect the board of directors or [change] the corporation's
charter," along with shareholders' ability to file derivative suits, were sufficient to protect shareholder
interests).
4. 558 U.S. at 361-62. Conversely, the dissent argued that hese "procedures of
corporate democracy" are actually "so limited as to be almost nonexistent," and concluded that
shareholder agency costs are quite large and thus justify regulation. Id. at 476-77 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 320 (1999)).
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financial corporations had $7.718 trillion in total debt outstanding in 2015.5 This
accounted for 34.4% of the capital structure for corporations in the United States.
6
Employees are also critical to the success of the firm, and while it is difficult to
measure the quantitative value of their importance to the firm, or the value of their
human capital investments, these are clearly substantial. Overall, the agency
conflicts faced by non-shareholders may be larger and more intractable than those
of shareholders, given that non-shareholders are further removed from the
mechanisms of corporate control. Moreover, as shareholder advocates have
managed to more closely align the interests of corporate decision makers and the
interests of shareholders in recent decades, this has created a greater potential for
conflict between the corporation's managers and its non-shareholder constituents.
Indeed, even shareholder primacy today is rooted in a theoretical approach that
recognizes the importance of non-shareholder constituencies. One of the most
widely accepted theories in corporate law today, the "nexus of contracts" approach,
explicitly recognizes the importance of non-shareholder constituencies in the
corporation. This contractarian paradigm, which builds on Ronald Coase's insight
that the firm exists to minimize high transaction costs, envisions the corporation as
a "nexus" at the center of a web of contractual and quasi-contractual relationships
with its various stakeholders, such as managers, shareholders, creditors, customers,
and non-managerial employees. While the contractarian theory also prioritizes the
interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders, it does so based on the
claim that shareholder primacy is what the corporate stakeholders themselves
would have agreed to in a hypothetical bargain without transaction costs. As such,
shareholder primacy is asserted to reflect the default rules of corporate governance,
insofar as it most efficiently facilitates private ordering.
Conventional legal and economic analyses have long tended to dismiss the
agency conflicts faced by non-shareholders by asserting that these agency conflicts
are best addressed through private ordering, most notably the negotiation of
contracts to protect the fixed interests of these stakeholders.7 Shareholders, under
this account, are more poorly situated to protect their interests through contract, and
their incentives are best aligned to maximize value for all of the corporation's
constituents, due to their status as residual claimants. But, as I argue in this Article,
even if one accepts these arguments for shareholder primacy in corporate
governance generally, a deeper inquiry demonstrates that these same arguments fail
when it comes to corporate governance of political activities.
And if the case for shareholder primacy in CPA fails, then it becomes clear that
the resulting non-shareholder agency costs are potentially quite significant and
perhaps intractable in the absence of external regulation of CPA, regulation of
5. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS
(2015) 79 tbl.L. 103 [hereinafter 2015 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT].
6. Id. (showing total corporate debt of $7.1777 trillion, which is roughly 34.4% of the
listed total market value of corporate equities of $22.4439 trillion).
7. As Frederick Tung has stated, "Traditionally, the central challenge [in corporate
law] has been to design governance arrangements optimally to close the gap between ownership and
control: to channel managers' discretion to benefit one specific class of investor-common
shareholders." Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room. The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders
in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV 115, 117-18 (2009).
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precisely the kind that the Supreme Court struck down in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti and Citizens United.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the historical emphasis on
shareholder agency costs in CPA. It points out that a consistent thread throughout
corporate political speech jurisprudence and the scholarship analyzing this has been
the notion that shareholder agency problems are a valid basis for regulating CPA.
Part 11 looks more broadly at agency costs in the context of corporate governance,
reviewing some of the literature on non-shareholder agency costs and describing
the contractarian argument for elevating the agency concerns of shareholders over
those of non-shareholders. Part III makes the argument that CPA does create
agency costs, and that these can be potentially very large. I lay out several
examples of CPA that served the interests of shareholders and harmed the interests
of non-shareholders. Part IV argues that neither corporate law nor private ordering
ameliorates these agency costs. Even if we accept the argument that corporate law's
prioritization of shareholder interests is appropriate and efficient for corporate
governance generally, a closer analysis demonstrates that shareholder primacy is
problematic when it comes to CPA. I also look at the prospect of contractual
covenants as a private ordering mechanism for reining in non-shareholder agency
costs, but conclude that the economic and constitutional barriers to such covenants
make them impracticable. In Part V, I explore some of the implications of my
arguments, before concluding.
I. Corporate Political Activity and Shareholder Agency Costs
The Supreme Court's controversial decision in Citizens United sparked a wave
of corporate law scholarship criticizing the Court's conception of the corporation
and its terse dismissal of the shareholder protection rationale for governmental
restrictions on corporate political expenditures. As I describe below, virtually all of
these corporate law critiques of Citizens United have focused on the problem of the
dissenting shareholder who does not want her invested capital to be spent on
political causes with which she disagrees. This problem of the dissenting
shareholder has been generally described as a principal-agent conflict between the
outside shareholder and the manager making decisions on behalf of the
S8
corporation.
As this Part explains, concerns about shareholder agency issues have long been
an important justification for legislative restrictions on CPA, and a central focus of
both the Supreme Court's corporate rights jurisprudence addressing such
restrictions and the corporate law scholarship related to this jurisprudence. Even the
Court's decisions in Bellotti and Citizens United, which struck down restrictions on
corporate political expenditures, acknowledge the importance of shareholder
agency problems, while finding that these are ameliorated by existing corporate law
and its "procedures of corporate democracy."
8. I discuss the agency framework in greater detail infra in Part II.
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A. "Other People's Money" and Shareholder Interests
As a number of corporate law scholars have noted, while the Court has
significantly expanded corporate rights in recent decades (and particularly since the
confirmation of Chief Justice Roberts), it has not grounded this expansion of
corporate rights in any coherent theory of the corporation or corporate personhood.
9
But while the Court's theoretical articulation of corporate rights may be
underdeveloped, there does appear to be one common thread throughout the
Court's jurisprudence in this area the principle that corporate rights are based in
"concerns about the property and contract interests of shareholders."'10 Indeed, the
protection of shareholder interests has historically always been a primary
justification for regulating CPA, as I describe in this section.
Efforts to restrict CPA did not begin until the early 2 0th century, primarily
because such activity was prohibited until at least the late 1 9 th century under the
doctrine of ultra vires. This doctrine strictly limited the activities of corporations,
including lobbying, to those authorized b their corporate charters. The frequent
assertion of quo warranto proceedings by state attorneys general challenging
corporate political activity of any kind reinforced the idea that the expenditure of
any money for political activity was impermissible for corporations.'3 Even after
9. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme
Court's Campaign Finance Cases, 15 J. CONST. L. 831, 857-860 (2013) (noting that the modern Court
has not yet adopted a theory of the corporation or its accompanying rights); Elizabeth Pollman,
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1657 (2011) ("While the Court has
significantly expanded corporate rights, it has not grounded these expansions in a coherent concept of
corporate personhood."); Stephen Bainbridge, Schumpeter on Corporate Personhood,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 26, 2011, 6:43 PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/03/schumpeter-on-corporate-
personhood.html ("While I agreed with the holding [in Fed. Commc'n Comm'n v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S.
- 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011)], 1 was disturbed that the Chief Justice's majority opinion for the Supreme
Court so obviously lacked a coherent theory of the nature of the corporation and, as such, also lacked a
coherent theory of what legal rights the corporation possesses."). But see Paul S. Miller, Shareholder
Rights: Citizens United and Delaware Corporate Governance Law, 28 J.L. POL. 51, 75-79 (2012)
(arguing that "Citizens United clearly states its vision of shareholder democracy" insofar s all of the
Justices emphasize the rights of shareholders, and the debate between the majority and dissent revolve
solely around the effectiveness of "the procedures of corporate democracy" in allowing shareholders to
control the corporation's political speech). Consistent with Miller's argument, some commentators have
noted that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion seems to expressly invite regulation that might improve
the "procedures of corporate democracy," so as to ameliorate the problem of dissenting shareholders.
See, e.g., Jamie B. Raskin, A Shareholder Solution to 'Citizens United,' WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2014.
10. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 9 at 1630.
11. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original. The
Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United With Corporate Law History 74, 80 (Harvard Law Sch. John
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 812, 2015). See also McConnell v.
Combination Mining & Milling Co., 79. P. 248, 251 (Mont. 1905) (holding that directors could not
charge corporations for lobbying expenses).
12. Quo warranto proceedings are writ actions requiring those wielding some form of
sovereign power to demonstrate the source of their authority. Today, they are most commonly used to
require public office holders to show that they are legally permitted to hold their position. See CAL.
ATT'Y GEN. OFFICE, Quo WARRANTO: RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES-RIGHT TO PUBLIC OFFICE 7-8
(1990).
13. Edward G. Reitler, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce: Reexamining
Corporate Political Rights Under the First Amendment, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 449, 454 (1991)
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states began chartering general business corporations in the late 181h century,
shareholders continued successfully to assert ultra vires actions against corporateS 14 i
political expenditures. It was not until the late 19th century that corporations
began to make significant expenditures related to political activity, ' 5 and even then,
these activities were deemed unlawful under the ultra vires doctrine until well into
the 20
h century. 16
Perhaps because CPA was seen as impermissible under ultra vires, and certainly
because of the fear of public backlash, the first corporate engagements with politics
in the late 19th and early 201h centuries were done in secrecy.17 Because there were
no campaign finance laws in place at this time, the public was largely unaware of
this activity.18 Corporations were heavily involved in the 1888, 1892, 1896, 1900,
and 1904 elections with little public suspicion of, and thus no public outcry over,
the extent of their political activities.19 This all changed in 1905, as a series of
scandals at the major New York life insurance companies involving corporate
political spending drove the New York State legislature to create the eponymous
"Armstrong Committee," named after its chair, state Senator William Armstrong.
The Armstrong Committee held hearings through the second half of 1905 and
uncovered evidence of massive donations secretly made by the largest life
insurance companies to the Republican National Committee and the campaign fund
of Theodore Roosevelt.
20 These findings were front page news across the country,
21
and sparked a popular outrage that is widely credited with spurring the passage of
the Tillman Act of 1907, which bans corporate contributions to political
candidates,22 as well as a wave of state legislation banning corporate political
expenditures and contributions beyond the restrictions already created by the
(citing Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American
Corporation Law 1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST. REV. 304, 305 (1979); Att'y Gen. v. Great E. Ry. Co., 11
Ch. D. 449, 503 (1879) Lord Bramwell (upholding the power of the attorney general to proceed against
a corporation for ultra vires acts).
14. Strine & Walter, supra note 11, at 74-75 & nn. 321-28.
15. See ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS 165 (1988)
(describing how, beginning in 1896, Mark Hanna, the Chairman of the Republican National Party, began
to "systematize" political fundraising from corporations).
16. People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 80 N.E. 383, 387 (N.Y. 1907) ("The company had
not the right, under the law of its existence, to agree to make contributions for political campaigns, any
more than to agree to do other things foreign to its charter .. "); McConnell v. Combination Mining &
Milling Co., 76 P. 194, 199 (Mont. 1904) ("[Political expenditures] were clearly outside the purposes for
which the corporation was created .... ). As Mutch describes, the view of CPA as ultra vires was
considered a settled question until at least the 1950s. MUTCH, supra note 15, at 178-179.
17. MUTCH, supra note 15, at 1-2 (explaining that CPA was "generally considered to
be illegitimate and so was carefully concealed").
18. Id.
19. See Adam Winkler, "'Other People's Money": Corporations, Agency Costs, and
Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 881-87 (2004); MUTCH, supra note 15, at 1-16, 165-66.
20. MUTCH, supra note 15, at 2-3.
21. Winkler, supra note 19, at 888-90.
22. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 35 Star. 864 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b); see also MUTCH, supra note 15 (describing how popular opinion pushed
Congress to enact the Tillman Act); Winkler, supra note 19, at 883-86.
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Tillman Act.2 3 Between 1905 and 1917, twenty-eight states enacted such laws (in
addition to the five states that already had such laws in place before 1905).24
Importantly, as Adam Winkler has documented, this public outrage was
primarily directed at concerns about he misuse of "other people's money" by
corporate executives. Public rhetoric and press accounts described corporate
campaign contributions, funded out of the general treasuries of these corporations,
as essentially "embezzlement" or "theft" of shareholder money to advance the
political interests of corporate insiders, such as by influencing legislators to pass
laws that shielded them from oversight and accountability.2 6 As Winkler notes, this
view of corporate political activity as a potential problem of managers misusing
"other people's money" is essentially a formulation of the principal-agent
problem.
2
In short, up until the late 19th century, CPA was barred under the doctrine of
ultra vires. When corporations began to engage in CPA notwithstanding these legal
limitations, Congress and state legislatures responded with external laws not
grounded in corporate law restricting CPA, and these regulatory restrictions were
based on a shareholder protection rationale that viewed CPA as a potential problem
of agency conflict between outside shareholders and inside managers. Shareholder
protection remained a central animating consideration in the Tillman Act and other
regulatory restrictions on corporate political activity up until the 1970s.
28
23. Lobbying bans were not part of this wave of legislation, in part because it has
long been understood that lobbying is "squarely" protected by both the Free Speech and Petition Clauses
of the First Amendment. See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 191, 196 (2012). Thus, in the post-ultra vires era, state and federal laws generally have not
sought to ban lobbying. One notable exception to this rule is the case of Georgia, which enacted a statute
in 1877 criminalizing lobbying of the Georgia general assembly, which was subsequently punishable by
a prison term of one to five years. This statute remained on the books until 1992. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL 6-7 &
15 n.7 (William V. Luneberg et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009). To the extent that there has been state and federal
regulation of lobbying, this has primarily come in the form of disclosure requirements or restrictions on
the ancillary activities of lobbyists. Such restrictions may, for example, limit lobbyists' campaign
contributions to a particular candidate; prevent them from serving in a fundraising role in a campaign;
ban "contingent-fee" lobbying, where a lobbyist receives a certain percentage of whatever contracts she
might help to procure for a client; or impose "revolving-door" terms, where former government officials
are barred from becoming lobbyists for some period of time after leaving office. See Hasen, supra, at
200-07.
24. See Ray La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, The Effects of Campaign Finance
Spending Bans on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence From the States, 33 ELECTORAL STUD. 102, 112 app. 1
(2014).
25. See Winkler, supra note 19, at 893-98, 912-26.
26. Id. at 893-985. But see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 81-82 (1975) (stating that the
legislative history of the Tillman Act "demonstrates that the protection of ordinary stockholders was at
best a secondary concern" and that the Act was "primarily concerned with corporations as a source of
aggregated wealth and therefore of possible corrupting influence, and not directly with the internal
relations between the corporations and their stockholders"). But the Cort court still acknowledged that
agency concerns about the relationship between shareholders and the corporation were an appropriate
basis for regulation. Id. at 84 (stating that express federal l w or state law could "govern the internal
affairs of the corporation").
27. See Winkler, supra note 19, at 906-12.
28. As Winkler recounts, agency costs were an important consideration in a series of
cases the Court decided between 1948 and 1972, collectively called the Segregated Fund Cases. These
cases allowed unions to set up Political Action Committees (PACs), which I describe in greater detail in
Part IIB, based on the idea that the funds' money was contributed voluntarily and not simply taken out
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B. Shareholder Protection in the Post-Bellotti Era
The regulatory framework for corporate political activities was radically
upended by the Court's decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, in
which Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority, invalidated a state ban on
corporate political expenditures on ballot initiatives that were unrelated to the
firm's core business interests, on the grounds that such spending was protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments' free speech protections.29 Importantly,
while the Bellotti majority rejected the argument that shareholder protection
justified this ban, it did expressly recognize that the protection of shareholders
against the misuse of their invested money constitutes "an interest that is both
legitimate and traditionally within the province of state law."
30
The Bellotti majority's invalidation of the statute in question relied critically on
its assertion that shareholders already had equate corporate governance measures
in place to protect their interests, in the form of "procedures of corporate
democracy" established by state corporate law. These procedures included
shareholders' "power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon protective
provisions in the corporation's charter," as well as shareholders' "access to the
judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to
have been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to further the personal
interests of management."3 ' In other words, while the Bellotti decision clearly
acknowledged the legitimacy and importance of shareholder agency problems as a
basis for restricting corporate political expenditures, it found that existing corporate
law measures were sufficient to address these shareholder agency concerns.
The Bellotti decision faced heavy criticism for failing to acknowledge the
complexities of the relationship between the corporation and the shareholder.
Victor Brudney, voicing a common view of the time, argued that the Court's
corporate political speech jurisprudence following Bellotti "d[id] not address the
problem of defining the appropriate relationship between corporate political
power ... and stockholders' individual political preferences."32 As Brudney noted,
there are significant potential agency conflicts between shareholders and managers
when it comes to corporate political activity, and these conflicts are not necessarily
resolved through existing corporate law mechanisms.33 To illustrate this agency
problem, he offered the example of a racist and sexist CEO who utilizes the
corporation's general treasury to give generously to a candidate who wants to pass
a constitutional amendment allowing race- and sex-based employment
of a union's general treasury. See Winkler, supra note 19, at 930-33 (citing United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106 (1948); United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v.
United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972)). While these cases were nominally limited to unions, it was clear
that the logic also applied to corporations. Corporations responded to the Segregated Funds Cases by
setting up their own PACs and encouraging their employees and shareholders to contribute, to avoid
violating the Tillman Act and other state and federal prohibitions on direct CPA. Id. at 933-35.
29. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
30. Id. at 791.
31. Id. at 794-795.
32. Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 239 (1981).
33. Id. at 242-45.
Vol. 33, 2016
Corporate Political Activity
discrimination, even though discriminating in this way will raise the firm's cost of
labor and thus be detrimental to the interests of its shareholders.34 As Brudney's
example shows, understanding and resolving the agency conflicts between
shareholders and managers is essential to answering the question of who is
engaging in corporate speech.
In the aftermath of Bellotti, the Court appeared to retreat from the strong view of
corporate political speech rights it had articulated in that opinion. A series of
subsequent decisions, including the Court's 1982 decision in FEC v. National Right
to Work Committee (NRWC),35 its 1986 decision in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life (MCFL),36 its 1990 decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,37 and its 2003 decision in FEC v. Beaumont,38 all seemed to reject the
reasoning in Bellotti, to the point where many election law scholars believed that
that decision was no longer good law.39 From a corporate governance perspective,
these cases seemed to depart significantly from Bellotti's assertion that "procedures
of corporate democracy" were sufficient to address potential shareholder agency
problems.
In NRWC, the Court upheld restrictions on corporate political contributions
based in part on the rationale that such restrictions were necessary to "protect the
individuals who have paid money into a corporation ... from having that money
used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed." 40 In MCFL,
the Court struck down restrictions on political expenditures as applied to a
nonprofit, nonstock corporation incorporated for the singular purpose of
"foster[ing] respect for human life." 4 1 In reaching this decision, the Court found it
"essential" that the corporation in question "ha[d] no shareholders or other persons
affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings" who might face "an
34. Id. at 243.
35. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
36. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
37. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
38. 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
39. See, e.g., Jill Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An
Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 613 (1991)
("[e]ven superficial scrutiny of the opinion in Austin reveals that it stands in absolute contradiction to the
principles set out in Bellotti"); Richard L. Hasen, Justice Souter: Campaign Finance Law's Emerging
Egalitarian, 1 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 169, 176 (2008) (stating that Beaumont "appears to reject" the
holding of Bellotti); Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and
Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 886 (2005) (speculating that
ballot initiatives limiting corporate political contributions and expenditures that would have been struck
down as unconstitutional in prior decades under Bellotti's reasoning "have a surprisingly good chance of
passing muster today"); Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform: Searching for Corruption in All
the Wrong Places, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 187, 217 (2003) (describing Beaumont as having "quietly, but
not explicitly overruled First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti"); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32
Loy. L. REV. 133, 134-36 (1998) (stating that the "conceptual, evidentiary, and theoretical" pillars on
which Bellotti had rested were "weakened, modified, or supplemented by developments in both judicial
doctrine and electoral politics," to the point where they were no longer valid bases for asserting a
coherent doctrine for corporate political speech).
40. 459 U.S. at 207-08 (citing United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948)).
41. 479 U.S. at 241-42.
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economic disincentive for disassociating with [the corporation] if they disagree
with its political activity."
'42
Both Austin and Beaumont relied heavily on the reasoning of MCFL. In Austin,
the Court upheld Michigan state prohibitions on corporate independent political
expenditures, as applied to the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a nonprofit
corporation with no shareholders. Despite the fact that the Chamber did not have
shareholders, the Austin Court found that the Chamber's members were similarly
situated to corporate shareholders, in that they might "be similarly reluctant to
withdraw as members even if they disagree with the Chamber's political
expression, because they wish to benefit from the Chamber's nonpolitical programs
and to establish contacts with other members of the business community."43 Thus,
relying on the reasoning of MCFL, the Austin Court found that the Chamber was
more like a for-profit corporation whose political expressions might create an
"economic disincentive for disassociating with it" than like the non-advocacy
corporation at issue in MCFL.
44
In Beaumont, the Court upheld prohibitions on corporate direct contributions to
political campaigns, as applied to non-profit advocacy corporations. While
Beaumont does not deal with shareholder protection, it is notable that he Beaumont
Court justified the structure of campaign finance law which barred direct
corporate contributions but allowed corporations to set up political action
committees (PACs) to solicit contributions from employees, stockholders, or
members to be used for political activity in large part based on a shareholder
protection rationale.
45
Bellotti may be understood as standing in part for the proposition that the
interest of protecting shareholders from agency conflicts arising from corporate
political activity, while valid, is obviated by state corporate law's existing
"procedures of corporate democracy." Subsequent cases addressing the question of
shareholder agency conflicts, from NRWC through Beaumont, have implicitly
rejected Bellotti's proposition that corporate law is sufficient to protect shareholder
interests, and thus have found that regulatory restrictions on CPA are justified in
part by a shareholder protection rationale. But Bellotti and these subsequent cases
are consistent insofar as they all recognize the validity of shareholder protection as
a basis for regulating corporate political activity.
C. Citizens United and Shareholder Protection
The reasoning of Bellotti was resurrected and extended in the Court's 2010
Citizens United decision, which invalidated federal prohibitions on "electioneering
communications" and strongly affirmed the idea that corporate political
expenditures are protected as speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
46
42. Id. at 264.
43. 494 U.S. 652, 663 (1990) (citing MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).
44. Id.
45. 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003) ("The PAC option allows corporate political
participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds
with the sentiments of some shareholders or members . .
46. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Relying essentially on the reasoning of Bellotti, Citizens United rejected the claim
that the government's interest in protecting "dissenting shareholders" justified such
prohibitions, on two bases: first, the asserted interest was overinclusive insofar as it
would also cover the political communications of media corporations;4  and
second, echoing Bellotti, that there was "little evidence of abuse that cannot be
corrected by shareholders 'through the procedures of corporate democracy."'
48
Like Bellotti, Citizens United was met with a strong backlash from corporate
law scholars. Much of this scholarship has closely examined the Court's claim that
existing "procedures of corporate democracy" sufficiently address shareholder
agency conflicts arising from CPA. Of course, not all CPA runs against the
interests of shareholders. CPA often benefits shareholders, and a good deal of CPA
may benefit other stakeholders as well.49 But the point that has been raised by
corporate law critics of CPA is that the realities of corporate governance such as
the severe information asymmetries between shareholders and managers, the high
degree of deference given to corporate insiders by the business judgment rule, and
the existence of large collective action and coordination costs make it difficult for
shareholders to effectively manage the conflicts between their interests and those of
corporate decision makers, and that these governance issues are especially acute
when it comes to CPA, because CPA has the potential to affect the rules of
corporate governance themselves. These corporate governance problems are
47. Id. at 361.
48. Id. at 362 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. 795, at 794 (1978)).
49. Many studies have found a positive relationship between political spending and
political favors. See, e.g., Lauren Cohen et al., Legislating Stock Prices, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 574 (2013);
Michael J. Cooper et al., Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns, 65 J. FIN. 687 (2010);
Kevin B. Grier et al., The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986, 88 AMER. POL. SC.
REV. 911 (1994); Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Interest-Group Competition and the
Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services'Political Action Committees,
88 AM. ECON. REV. 1163 (1998); James M. Snyder, Jr., Campaign Contributions as Investments: The
U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1195 (1990); Thomas Stratmann,
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?, 77 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 127 (1995). Many of these favors appear to benefit the corporation receiving them. For
example, Richter et al. find that higher levels of political lobbying are closely correlated with lower
corporate tax rates, with an average 1% increase in lobbying leading to lower effective tax rates of 0.5%
to 1.6% for the average firm. Brian Kelleher Richter et al., Lobbying and Taxes, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 893,
893-94 (2009). Bonardi et al. find that direct corporate political expenditures are associated with better
regulatory outcomes (in enforcement, adjudicatory, and rulemaking actions) for regulated utilities. Jean-
Philippe Bonardi et al., Nonmarket Strategy Performance: Evidence from US. Electric Utilities, 49
ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 1209, 1218 (2006). Goldman et al. find that corporate political activity-
specifically, the political connections of board members of publicly traded companies-is significantly
correlated with the procurement of government contracts. Fitan Goldman et al., Politically Connected
Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts, 17 REV. FIN. 1617, 1617-18 (2013).
Thus, it seems that corporate political spending does lead to some benefits, although it's not entirely
clear who receives these benefits. The empirical evidence on whether CPA benefits shareholders is
somewhat mixed, see infra notes 53 and 54. But regardless of whether CPA actually benefits
shareholders or not, it would seem that, at least in theory, the positive value that typically accompanies
CPA can accrue to all corporate stakeholders, and not just to corporate insiders or shareholders.
50. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, Jr., supra note 1; Brudney, supra note 32; Carol R.
Goforth, "A Corporation Has No Soul"-Modern Corporations, Corporate Governance, and
Involvement in the Political Process, 47 Hous. L. REV. 617 (2010); Thomas W. Joo, The Modern
Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 80 (2001); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of
Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Cases, 15 J. CONST. L. 831, 835-43
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exacerbated in today's global capital markets, where most shares of large publicly
traded companies are owned by intermediaries (such as mutual funds and pension
funds) rather than directly held by individual shareholders, creating another layer of
agency costs.51
Given that CPA can potentially lead to high agency costs for shareholders, a key
question is whether, as the Supreme Court has asserted in Bellotti and Citizens
United, existing "procedures of corporate democracy" sufficiently address these
agency conflicts, and this has been the subject of a robust debate in the literature.
CPA is governed by the same rules of corporate governance as general business• . 52
activities, and as discussed infra in Part II, there has been much research on the
question of whether corporate law and its fealty to the principles of shareholder
primacy solves the agency problems between shareholders and corporate insiders.
Thus, it is not surprising that there is a similar debate over the question of whether,
and to what extent, corporate political activity is good for shareholders. A growing
body of empirical research has looked into this question, with many scholars
finding that CPA harms shareholders,53 and others finding that CPA benefits
(2013); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629 (2011);
Robert B. Sobelman, An Unconstitutional Response to Citizens United: Mandating Shareholder
Approval of Corporate Political Expenditures, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 341 (2011); Robert Sprague & Mary
Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus: Breathing Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM.
Bus. L.J. 507 (2012); Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 533 (2010) (pointing out that
shareholder suits against corporate waste must survive the wide latitude of the business judgment rule);
Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political
Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 56-57 (2009) (pointing out how severe information asymmetries
between corporate insiders and outside shareholders make it difficult for shareholders to monitor the
political activities of the corporation, and collective action problems make it difficult for them to utilize
the procedures of corporate democracy effectively).
51. See Jordan M. Barry et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory
of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership, 99 VA. L. REV. 1103 (2013); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Agency Costs ofAgency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance
Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and
Sanctioning Political Spending After Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 443 (2012).
52. Bebchuk & Jackson, Jr., supra note 1, at 83 ("Under existing law, a corporation's
decision to engage in political speech is governed by the same rules as ordinary business decisions,
which give directors and executives virtually plenary authority.").
53. See, e.g., Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political Donations: Investment or
Agency, 14 Bus. & POL. 1 (2012) (finding a negative relationship between corporate political donations
and annual returns); Bebchuk & Jackson, Jr., supra note 1 (exploring the structural difficulties that
minority shareholders face in addressing agency problems for CPA); Coates, supra note 1 (finding that
politically active corporations experience a decline in share value); Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations
Play Politics?. The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005); Thomas W. Joo, The Modern
Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 80 (2001); Robert Sitkoff, Politics and the Business
Corporation, 26 REG. 30 (2003-04); Timothy Werner & John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent
Expenditures, and Agency Costs: Reexamining the Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 129-30 (2014) (finding that state legislatures are more likely to pass
antitakeover statutes, which protect management against outside shareholders, when corporations are
unrestricted in their corporate political expenditures, suggesting significant shareholder agency costs in
this regard); Winkler, supra note 19; Hollis A. Skaife & Timothy Werner, Deregulation of Firm
Investments Under Citizens United and Firm Value (2014) (unpublished working paper) (finding that
firms with high levels of political activity prior to Citizens United generally saw abnormally negative
returns following the decision, suggesting high shareholder agency costs). But see Stephen Ansolabehere
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shareholders.54 One important reason why there is such a lack of consensus, despite
the large amount of research into this question, is that "[u]nlike other investments,
the return on engaging in the political process is difficult, if not impossible, to
calculate."
' 55
This divide in the literature matches up neatly with the opposition between
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Stevens's dissent in Citizens United
over this same shareholder agency cost question. One of the government's primary
arguments in that case was that campaign finance regulations were justified based• • 56 ..
on a shareholder protection rationale. As aforementioned, the majority rejected
this argument on the basis of its observation that here is "little evidence of abuse
that cannot be corrected by shareholders 'through the procedures of corporate
democracy. "' 5 Conversely, the dissent argued that these "procedures of corporate
democracy" are actually "so limited as to be almost nonexistent," and concluded
that these agency problems are therefore quite large.
58
Does corporate law bridge the shareholder-manager agency conflicts that may
arise from CPA? In short, while the empirical answer may be up for debate, the
legal answer is clear. The majority in Citizens United decisively declared that the
existing procedures of corporate governance and the shareholder primacy norm
that are reflected in them are sufficient to address any shareholder agency
problem that might exist.
II. Agency Costs and Corporate Law
While the debate over corporate political activity has revolved exclusively
around shareholder agency costs, corporate law has long recognized that here are
many other types of agency relationships and resulting agency costs within the
modern public corporation. While shareholder interests are still emphasized in
et al., Did Firms Profit From Soft Money?, 3 ELECTION L.J. 193 (2004) (finding no relationship between
corporate expenditures on political campaigns and stock price).
54. Shapiro and Dowson have a good summary of the literature finding that CPA
benefits shareholder interests. SHAPIRO & DOwsON, supra note 1. Cooper et al. find a positive
relationship between CPA and returns on equity. Cooper et al., supra note 49. Yuan finds that
corporations with a long history of corporate political contributions saw an increase in share price
following Supreme Court decisions that deregulated campaign finance r strictions, suggesting that
shareholders saw benefits in CPA. Haishan Yuan, Court-Ordered Campaign Finance Deregulation and
Stock Value of Contributors, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2015). However, Ansolabehere et al. find no
relationship between corporate political expenditures and corporate long-term earnings. Ansolabehere et
al., supra note 53. Chen et al. have a somewhat more nuanced finding, concluding that the firms that
engage in the highest level of lobbying expenditures do see abnormally high returns of 5.5% over their
peers, but that firms engaged in less intensive lobbying do not experience improved performance. Hui
Chen et al., Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance, 42 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 444, 472 (2015).
55. Felix Oberholzer-Gee et al., Note on Lobbying 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Background
Note 707-471, 2007).
56. Supplemental Reply Brief for the Appellant at 6-7, Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205); see also Richard Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion
Rationale, 27 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 989 (2010) (describing how the government abandoned one of the
key rationales for restricting corporate political activities, and "recast" it as a shareholder protection
rationale).
57. 558 U.S. at 361-62.
58. Id. at 476-77 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Blair
& Stout, supra note 4, at 320).
Yale Journal on Regulation
corporate theory, it is not because shareholders are the only corporate constituents
who face agency costs, but rather because, as I explain in this Part, it is thought that
their agency costs are the most intractable.
This Part begins by situating agency costs in corporate law, and describing the
nexus-of-contracts approach to corporate law. It describes the various agency costs
faced by the two most important non-shareholder groups of corporate
constituents creditors and employees. It then lays out the contractarian case for
prioritizing shareholder interests despite the presence of significant non-
shareholder agency costs.
A. Situating Agency Costs in Corporate Law
Agency costs have been a central focus of corporate law scholarship since at
least 1932, when Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means identified the separation of
ownership and control as the central feature of the modem American public
corporation.5 9 As Berle and Means noted, this separation of the corporation's
ownership from its control "produces a condition where the interests of owner and
of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge."60 This agency conflict inherent to
the corporate structure has occupied the attention of modem corporate law scholars
ever since.
For several decades after Berle and Means unveiled their influential thesis on
the corporation, the agency problem embedded in corporate governance was
primarily understood as a relatively simple principal-agent conflict between
shareholders, who were viewed as the outside owners of the corporation, and
corporate managers, who were seen as the agents of these shareholders.6 1 However,
even at the time of Berle and Means, there were many who asserted that the
corporation was a more complex structure than this simple principal-agent model
between shareholders and managers might suggest. As Berle and Means themselves
noted, many of their contemporaries considered other corporate interest holders,S62
including creditors and even employees, to be part owners of the corporation.
Indeed, in a widely read 1932 treatise, Merrick Dodd, a highly respected corporate
59. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 113-16,310-13 (10th prtg. 2009) (1932).
60. Id. at 7.
61. As the prominent corporate law scholar Merrick Dodd noted, "The conception of
a business corporation as the property of its shareholders is deeply rooted both in our legal and our
economic traditions ... . [I]t is our lawyer's theory, as well as the business man's tradition, that the
business corporation is an association of shareholders conducted for the profit of shareholders, and that,
if the corporation owns the business, the shareholders in turn own the corporation." E. Merrick Dodd,
Jr., The Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 917,
917-18 (1941); see also Merrick E. Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145, 1146 (1932) [hereinafter Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?] ("The
business is still a private enterprise existing for the profit of its owners, who are now the shareholders.");
J.A.C. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 250 (1969) ("The legal conception of the shareholder's position in
the corporation has not changed appreciably during the past 70 years. In a word, he is the owner of the
company, possessed of the legal attributes generally associated with that status .... In the corporate
context the law generally follows economic theory by giving the shareholder-as owner-control over
the business enterprise.").
62. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 59, at 113.
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law scholar who was seen as a principal foil to Berle and Means, went so far as to
argue that the corporation owed a fiduciary responsibility not just to its
shareholders but also to its employees and customers.
63
Over time, the idea that shareholders "owned" the corporation became
increasingly seen as both theoretically flawed and descriptively inaccurate. Rather,
the dominant view among corporate law scholars today is closer to the minority
view put forth by Dodd and others back in the 1930s that the public corporation is
better understood as an aggregation of different economic inputs from shareholders,
creditors, employees (including managers and non-managerial workers), directors,
suppliers, and other corporate stakeholders. It was this, more nuanced,
understanding of the corporation that undergirded Michael Jensen and William
Meckling's canonical 1976 argument that the corporation should be seen as a
"nexus of contracts" between its many different stakeholders. Building off of64
Ronald Coase's theory that the firm exists to minimize transaction costs, Jensen
and Meckling asserted that modem corporations are best understood as "legal
fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships" between
investors, managers, employees, suppliers, and consumers.65  Under this
"contractarian" view, the corporation exists primarily to minimize the significant
transaction costs that would arise if each of these sets of counterparties were to
contract separately with one another. But while the corporation may serve to
minimize these transaction costs, it also creates myriad agency relationships.
66
Embedded in each of these different contractual (or quasi-contractual) relationships
63. Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, supra note 61, at 1145.
64. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). While Coase
himself was somewhat vague about what transaction costs were, a significant body of subsequent work
has defined the contours of this concept. Transaction costs, which are roughly defined as the costs of
contracting, include information costs, negotiating costs, the cost of writing contracts, and the costs of
enforcing contractual terms. As Williamson famously showed, transaction costs may be most severe
when economic actors make investments specific to the relationship, such as when an electricity plant is
built near a coal mine that is meant to supply it, or a worker undergoes extensive training to learn to
operate a specific set of machinery. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 52-56 (1985). Such investment produces a form of "quasi rent" that can be captured by one
set of economic actors, such as when the coal company threatens to stop supplying the nearby power
plant unless it receives a significant price increase. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298-302 (1978).
This creates the potential for unproductive rent seeking between the firm's stakeholders, which is often
carried out through post-contractual opportunism. Id.
65. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). This "nexus of
contracts" view of the corporation has since been adopted and extended by countless corporate
governance and corporate finance scholars. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 292-93 (2d ed. 1977); Steven Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 25 J.L. & ECON. 301
(1983); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416
(1989); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON
301 (1983); Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and
Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory
of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims:
Obligations to Non-shareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1266 (1999); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. FIN. 567
(1988); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984).
66. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 65, at 308.
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is such an agency relationship, along with the agency conflicts that this type of
relationship presents.6 7 Thus, while the contractarian view of the corporation
derives from transaction cost theory, it emphasizes agency conflicts, as it focuses
on the conflicting interests between the different stakeholders connected to the
corporate "nexus" at the center of these contractual and quasi-contractual
relationships.
68
One of the key insights of Jensen and Meckling was to recognize that the
problem of agency relationships within the corporation, which had previously been
studied almost exclusively as a shareholder-manager issue, actually extends to a
much broader range of contractual (and quasi-contractual) relationships, including
those involving employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors, among others.
69
Jensen and Meckling characterized the negative consequences of these agency
conflicts as "agency costs," which they defined as the sum of the monitoring and
bonding costs incurred to ensure that the agent acts in the principal's best interests,
along with any residual loss that occurs because the agent nonetheless acts in ways
that are adverse to those interests. Jensen and Meckling's "nexus of contracts"
approach and the agency cost framework that accompanies it have come to
dominate corporate law thinking over the last several decades. 
7 1
Before continuing, it is worth taking a few moments to explain the relationship
between agency costs, theories of the firm, and theories of corporate law. As one
scholar has stated, "There is some confusion in legal scholarship about the
relationship between the principal-agent framework and the theory of the firm." 72
Agency theory is an analytical tool used to study various problems across a wide
array of disciplines. 73 It has had a strong influence in scholarship about the theory
67. Id. at 310.
68. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 621, 634-35 (2004); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 65, at 310.
69. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 65, at 310.
70. Id. at 308-10. While monitoring costs and residual loss are relatively
straightforward concepts, the idea of bonding expenditures may benefit from a brief explanation. Jensen
and Meckling posit that, in a hypothetical contract, the principal may seek to provide contractual terms
and guarantees that more closely align ("bond") the manager's incentives with those of the principal. Id.
at 325-26. In practice, bonding expenditures most commonly take the form of incentives, particularly
incentive-based compensation. See generally Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay
and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).
71. While there have been a number of prominent critiques of the nexus-of-contracts
approach, even these critiques have tended to acknowledge the broad adoption of the contractarian view
among academics, judges, and practitioners. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Law and the Team
Production Problem, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 33, 34 (Claire
A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) (stating that the Jensen and Meckling view "dominated
corporate law and economics scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s, and continues to be influential
today"); Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85, 85 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds.,
2012) (stating that the "nexus of contracts" approach "remains foundational in the field [of corporate
law]").
72. Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L.
REV. 727, 728 (2004).
73. Agency models are used to study a wide array of topics in law and economics
besides the theory of the firm, including contracts law, intellectual property, and administrative law. See,
e.g., Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Eric A.
Posner ed. 2000). They are also used to study problems in accounting, finance, marketing, political
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of the firm why firms exist, what determines the boundaries of the firm, and how
firms should be organized.74 But agency theory is one of several different analytical
frameworks used in developing theories of the firm.75
While there are a number of different theories of the firm, only several have had
significant impact on corporate law. 76 Many leading theories of the firm, such as
the property-rights theory developed by Grossman, Hart, and Moore,7 7 the
incomplete contracts theory posited by Williamson, 8 or Rajan and Zingales's
"access" theory of the firm, 79 have failed to gain much traction in the corporate law
literature. 
80
While agency theory might accurately be described as influential in theory of
the firm, it has been a primary focus of corporate law scholarship. As several
leading corporate law scholars have stated:
[M]uch of corporate law can usefully be understood as responding to three principal sources of
opportunism: conflicts between managers and shareholders, conflicts among shareholders, and
conflicts between shareholders and the corporation's other constituencies, including creditors
and employees. All three of these generic conflicts may usefully be characterized as ...
'agency problems.'1
Two theories of the firm that have attracted significant attention in corporate
law, in addition to the nexus-of-contracts approach, are the stakeholder and team
production models. The stakeholder model is often attributed to the business
management scholar R. Edward Freeman,82 but its roots go back at least as early as
Merrick Dodd's arguments against shareholder wealth maximization in 1932, and
science, and sociology, among others. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory. An Assessment and
Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 57 (1989).
74. Meurer, supra note 72, at 728.
75. See Eisenhardt, supra note 73, at 63-64. As Eisenhardt describes, other
frameworks used to examine the theory of the firm include political models, the informational
processing approaches to contingency theory, organizational control theory, and transaction cost theory.
Id. Other approaches include team production theory, see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972);
stakeholder theory, see R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
(1984); and property rights theory, see Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of
the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
76. See Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law.
Returning to the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (2012) (stating that "[r]esearch
on the theory of the firm ... has been relatively unplumbed in corporate law").
77. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995);
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership. A Theory of Vertical and
Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the
Nature ofthe Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
78. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 64.
79. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 387 (1998).
80. See Bodie, supra note 76, at 1040-45.
81. John Armour et al., The Essential Elements of Corporate Law. What is Corporate
Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 3
(2009).
82. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
(1984).
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arguably back to the origins of the corporation itself.8 3 In recent years, the
stakeholder model of the corporation has been most closely tied to Kent Greenfield,
a law professor at Boston College.s4 This model rejects the idea of shareholder
primacy and instead asserts that "all persons or groups with legitimate interests
participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is no prima
facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another."
8 5
The team production theory has its origins in the work of Armen Alchian and
Harold Demsetz, who analyzed the problems posed when there is joint or team
production by various actors who combine their efforts in the hopes of increasing
productivity beyond the sum of their individual efforts.86 Margaret Blair and Lynn
Stout famously utilized this theory to articulate their team production theory of
corporate law.87 They argued that the corporation serves as a "mediating hierarchy"
that addresses the team production problems identified by Alchian and Demsetz by
requiring the various "team members" of the corporation (including shareholders,
managers, employees, and creditors) to give up control of their investments in the
firm in order to minimize the potential conflicts among the team members that
might otherwise arise. 8 Under this view, shareholder interests should not be
prioritized any more than the interests of other team members.
It should be noted that both of these models of the corporation are consistent
with agency theory. Indeed, stakeholder theory is often seen as an outgrowth of
traditional agency theory, and some advocates of the stakeholder model have
expressly conceptualized stakeholder theory within the context of agency costs.
8 9
Team production theory, on the other hand, contends that mainstream corporate
law's focus on agency costs is myopic and ignores the significant team production
issues presented by cooperative endeavors between different parties who contribute
some kind of firm-specific investment.90 But while advocates of team production
83. For much of its history, the corporation was understood as an organizational form
that was granted by the state and which owed its existence to the state. See generally Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, The Cyclical Transformation of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate
Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005) (describing the longstanding view of the
corporation as deriving its authority and existence from the state, from its origins in Roman law through
the middle ages and into the late 19" century). This "concession" or "artificial entity" theory of the
corporation asserts that the corporation owes a duty first and foremost to the state and its citizens. It may
be seen as consistent with the stakeholder theory, insofar as both theories may be viewed as
"communitarian" theories of the firm. See, e.g., Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge-The Reluctant Stakeholder:
Theoretical Problems in the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 193, 230-31
(2005).
84. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 24 (2008) (proposing that all important stakeholders in the corporation,
including employees, communities, long-term business partners, and creditors be represented on the
corporate board).
85. Thomas Donaldson & Lee Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 65, 68 (1995).
86. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
87. Blair & Stout, supra note 4.
88. Id. at 250-55, 273-79.
89. See, e.g., Charles W.L. Hill & Thomas M. Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, 29
J. MGMT. STUD. 131, 132 (1992).
90. See Blair & Stout, supra note 4.
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theory may believe that agency costs are overemphasized, they do not contend that
agency costs are an unimportant problem in corporate governance.
91
Both the stakeholder and team production models have been quite influential
and are arguably quite convincing normative theories of corporate law. If we
adopted either model, it would be clear that non-shareholder interests should be
closely considered by managers and directors, not only with respect to their
decisions to engage in corporate political activity, but for all business decisions.
However, while these theories may be theoretically compelling, they have not been
widely adopted by practitioners, policy makers, or judges, who have tended to view
corporate law as prioritizing the interests of shareholders over those of other
corporate stakeholders (or team members).
92
Importantly for the purposes of this Article, these alternative theories of
corporate law have generally been ignored by the Supreme Court. For example, in
Citizens United, while Justice Stevens's dissent explicitly disavows the adoption of• 94
any particular model of the corporation,9 3 it is telling that both his dissent94 and
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion9 5 focus exclusively on the rights and interests
of shareholders, and not on those of other corporate stakeholders. This emphasis on
shareholder rights is consistent with the Court's previous reasoning in Bellotti,9 6 in
which the Court looked solely to the rights of shareholders and ignored the interests
of other corporate stakeholders. The failure to consider the interests of other
corporate stakeholders i also reflected in the corporate law literature on corporate
political activity, which, as I describe supra in Part I, has to date looked solely at
the agency costs such activity poses to shareholders.
B. Contractarianism and Non-Shareholder Agency Costs
As aforementioned, one of the central insights of Jensen and Meckling was to
recognize the importance of agency conflicts faced by non-shareholders.
91. Id; see also Ron Harris, The History of Team Production Theory, 38 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 537, 538 (2015) (contending that team production theory and agency theory "are designed to
solve different problems, and, therefore, can coexist in different types of corporations").
92. See Leo J. Strine, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 453-55
(2014) (noting that "[i]n American corporate law, only stockholders get o elect directors, vote on
corporate transactions and charter amendments, and sue to enforce the corporation's compliance with
the corporate law and the directors' compliance with their fiduciary duties," and that "this allocation of
power has a profound effect" in elevating the interests of shareholders over the interests of others).
93. 558 U.S. 310, 465 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of state
concession[,] ... a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts[,] ... a mediated hierarchy of
stakeholders[,] ... or any other recognized model").
94. Id. at 475-78.
95. Id. at 361-62.
96. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Bellotti Court specifically noted that the protection of
dissenting shareholders is "an interest that is both legitimate and traditionally within the province of
state law." Id. at 792. But it rejected the state's regulation of corporate political expenditures (meant to
sway public opinion on a ballot initiative), in large part based on the Court's view that "shareholders
normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests," id at 795, by utilizing "the procedures
of corporate democracy," id. at 794, such as by electing directors, insisting upon protective provisions in
the corporate charter, or filing derivative suits.
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Envisioning the corporation as a web of contractual relationships between different
corporate stakeholders makes clear that each of these sets of stakeholders not just
the shareholder class faces potentially significant agency costs in its dealings with
the corporation. Like shareholders, non-shareholders invest their resources in the
corporation and thus have reason to care that the firm is being managed in their
interest, but face high costs and difficulties in ensuring that this happens.
Moreover, the success of shareholder primacy advocates in convincing the
business world, the business law bench, and the academy of the merits of adopting
the "religion" of shareholder primacy has exacerbated the agency osts faced by
non-shareholders.9 7 As shareholder-centrism has become internalized in corporate
law and corporate governance, non-shareholders are faced with an additional layer
of agency costs. Non-shareholders have to worry about agency costs vis-A-vis
corporate insiders and also vis-A-vis corporate shareholders. Whether corporate
decision makers are acting in their own interests or in the interests of shareholders,
either scenario can create potential agency costs for non-shareholders. This new
"shareholder-centric reality," as Edward Rock has described the current state of
corporate law, has caused many corporate law scholars to look more closely at the
agency costs faced by non-shareholders.
98
The two largest and most important non-shareholder constituencies are
generally thought to be creditors and employees.99 The agency costs faced by these
non-shareholder groups have therefore received the most attention from corporate
law scholars. As such, I focus on these particular non-shareholder groups in this
Article, although many of the observations and conclusions I make may also be
applicable to other non-shareholder groups, such as consumers or suppliers. The
observations below are general ones, in large part because "[a]gency costs can
rarely be observed directly."'
100
1. Creditor Agency Costs
In many ways, the distinction between shareholders and creditors has been
rendered obsolete by the globalization of capital markets, the invention (and
constant reinvention) of structured finance, and the universal adoption of portfolio
97. As one Businessweek article in 2010 memorably stated, "If business school were
church, shareholder value maximization would be its religion." N. Craig Smith & Luk Van Wassenhove,
How Business Schools Lost Their Way, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 11, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2010-01-11/how-business-schools-lost-their-waybusinessweek
-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
98. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 1907, 1917-23 (2013).
99. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As a Multi-
Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1499 (1990) [hereinafter Coffee, Unstable Coalitions] ("The two
largest [non-shareholder] constituents ... are creditors and employees."). It is also worth noting that
there can be significant agency costs between employees and creditors, particularly when a firm is in or
near insolvency. See generally Bradley Blaylock et al., The Role of Government in the Labor-Creditor
Relationship: Evidence from the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 50 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 325
(2015) (analyzing the role of government in the labor-creditor relationship when a firm is in distress).
100. Rock, supra note 98, at 1916.
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theory and quantitative portfolio management.101 The increased use of credit
derivatives, including synthetic derivatives, has also made this distinction largely
moot.102 As Frank Partnoy convincingly demonstrates, options can (and do) negate
the economic differences between the rights held by shareholders and creditors,
making it difficult to assess both who is owed a fiduciary duty and what this
fiduciary duty comprises.10 3 At the same time, as Jordan Barry describes,
derivatives (including options) can separate voting rights from economic interests,
thus creating "empty voters" (those holding voting rights without an economic
stake in the firm) and "hidden owners" (those holding economic interests without a
voting stake in the firm).104 Similarly, derivatives can decouple the creditor's
ability to influence corporate governance from the creditor's economic interest. 105
That being said, it is clear that creditors are treated differently under corporate
law and cannot generally expect to rely on fiduciary duties or other governance
measures to protect their interests. Like employees, creditors face sharp frictions in
their dealings with the corporation, both with respect to managers and
shareholders.106 Of course, managers acting in their own self-interest can pose an
agency problem for creditors. But creditors also face additional agency costs, to the
101. As Baird and Henderson, among others, have noted, the use of call and put
options to limit the floor and ceiling of investor gains and losses, which has been "going on for a long
time," effectively eliminates the differences between debt and equity from the perspective of the
investor. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309,
1311-12 (2008). The development of modem financial products such as synthetic derivatives has also
rendered the differences between debt and equity largely moot. Id. at 1311-12.
102. See Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L.
REV. 599, 608 (2000); Yesha Yadav, The Case for a Market in Debt Governance, 67 VAND. L. REV.
771, 773 (2014).
103. Partnoy, supra note 102, at 608-28.
104. Barry et al., supra note 51, at 1104; see also Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy,
Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 787-804 (2005) (describing the same problem as one of
"encumbered shares").
105. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid
Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 FUR. FIN. MGMT. 663 (2008) (analyzing
the risks associated with unbundling economic and legal rights); Yadav, supra note 102, at 775-76
(analyzing how credit default swaps separate economic risk and legal rights). Lubben and Tung also
discuss how credit derivatives can incentivize creditors to act against the best interests of debt investors
generally. Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J.
405, 423-27 (2007); Tung, supra note 7, at 167-69.
106. As with shareholders, creditors are a very heterogeneous group. The usual
taxonomy of corporate debt divides it into two categories-private debt, which includes direct loans and
traditional private placements of bonds, and public debt, which encompasses publicly offered corporate
bonds. See Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure For Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV.
447, 456-57 (1999); Matteo Arena, The Corporate Choice Between Public Debt, Bank Loans,
Traditional Private Debt Placements, and 144A Debt Issues, 36 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 391,
391-94 (2011); Simon H. Kwan & Willard T. Carleton, Financial Contracting and the Choice Between
Private Placement and Publicly Offered Bonds , 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 907, 907-11 (2010).
There are also bonds that are privately placed under SEC Rule 144A. These 144A bonds are sometimes
referred to as private debt. See, e.g., David J. Denis & Vassil T. Mihov, The Choice Among Bank Debt,
Non-Bank Private Debt, and Public Debt: Evidence from New Corporate Borrowings, 70 J. FIN. EcON.
3 (2003). But perhaps because they are widely dispersed and traded, 144A bonds more closely resemble
public debt in many ways, including their underwriting characteristics and terms (such as a lack of
covenants). Amihud et al., supra, at 456 n.32. Private debt and public debt have distinct characteristics,
and thus there are different types of agency costs and contracting costs associated with the creditors in
each category. I discuss some of these differences in greater detail in Part IV.
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extent that managers may also be acting in the best interests of shareholders. It is
well recognized that equity investors have interests that are distinct from, and often
adverse to, the interests of debt investors. 107 This is particularly true when it comes
to their relative tolerances for risk. As one leading economist has stated, "Equity
holders have a more complex attitude towards firm risk [than creditors]. Equity
holders have both upside potential, if the firm prospers, and downside potential, if
the firm fails."'1 8 Edward Rock describes this "shareholder-creditor agency cost"
problem slightly differently, asserting that the core of this conflict lies in the fact
that "shareholders, holding the residual claim on the firm, have an incentive to
externalize risk onto creditors and other fixed claimants."'
10 9
There are a number of different ways in which firms can externalize risk onto
creditors for the benefit of shareholders."10 They can increase the riskiness of the
projects they undertake. As Robert Merton famously showed, when corporations
invest in assets or projects with higher volatility, this increases both the value of the
firm's equity and the default risk for creditors."'I Amihud et al. illustrate this
concept with a simple example:
Consider a company with $100 in cash (and no other assets) and $80 in short-term debt, so the
debt is currently worth about $80 and the stock is worth $20. If the company invested all of its
cash in a project with a 50% chance of yielding $10 and a 50% chance of yielding $150,
shareholders would benefit-the [expected] value of the equity would increase from $20 to
$35-and creditors would be hurt-the value of the debt would decline from $80 to $45. More
significantly, the value of the company as a whole would decline from $100 to $80.11
Corporations can also benefit shareholders while harming creditors in other
ways. They can direct assets to shareholders through higher dividend payments.
1 13
They can refrain from adding new equity, even when this capital could be deployed
107. See, e.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting:
An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979) (describing some of the contractual
covenants used by debt investors to help control this misalignment of interests). Moreover, as Richard
Squire notes, the problem of shareholder influence is also exacerbated by the problem of "correlation-
seeking," insofar as they may seek to encourage risks that only materialize upon the event of an
uncertain future event. Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1151, 1153 (2010).
108. Robert R. Bliss, Market Discipline: Players, Processes and Purposes, in
MARKET DISCIPLINE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 37, 43 (Claudio Borio et al. eds., 2004).
109. Rock, supra note 98, at 1927.
110. See William W. Bratton, Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics
and Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and Process, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 39, 43-47 (2006)
[hereinafter Bratton, Bond Covenants]; Smith & Warner, supra note 107, at 118-19.
111. Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of
Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449, 455-67 (1974). Merton uses the Black-Scholes model of option pricing to
reach his conclusions. Id. But see Bliss, supra note 108, at 43-44 (arguing that the use of the Black-
Scholes model is overly simplistic, and that share prices should theoretically also consider the reduced
value of future dividends and increased cost of funding that accompanies higher default risk).
112. Amihud et al., supra note 106, at 454 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 454
nn.20-22.
113. See Rock, supra note 98, at 1929. See also Geren v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 823
F. Supp. 728, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing a bondholder complaint that the defendant corporation
had borrowed $1.221 billion to pay a special dividend to shareholders, causing shareholder equity to
drop to negative $406 million and the market value of the outstanding bonds to drop by half).
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to projects with positive value.1 14 They can increase leverage, which can cause
harm to creditors in various ways. As the surge in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the
1980s illustrated, the use of increased debt, such as junk bonds, can finance
acquisitions at higher share prices, but the addition of large amounts of short-term
debt increases the risk of default for longer-term creditors.115 Firms can also add
debt that is senior or equal in priority to the debt that is outstanding, thus
effectively displacing the priority of existing creditors and increasing their risk of
loss.116 LBOs generally provide large benefits to shareholders117 while causing
significant losses to creditors. 118
The problem of creditor agency costs has increased as corporate managers have
become more shareholder-centric in their priorities. Since the 1980s, changes in
managerial compensation, shareholder concentration and activism, and board
composition and ideology have served to more closely align the interests of
corporate managers and shareholders.1 19 These changes include the increased use
of equity-based compensation for corporate managers, the r duced use of staggered
boards, smaller boards of directors with more frequent meetings, and the use of
"say on pay" provisions allowing shareholders to voice their disapproval of
manager compensation packages, among other things. The trend towards aligning
the interests of shareholders and managers has had the effect of decreasing agency
costs between these two constituencies, but it has come at the expense of increasing
creditor-manager and creditor-shareholder agency costs. This is true not only
theoretically, but empirically as well. Corporations with structural features that
more closely align the interests of management and shareholders, such as equity-
based compensation or managerial ownership, have higher bond yields than those
that do not. 120 Bank debt exhibits the same phenomenon, as corporations that are
114. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON.
147, 152-60 (1977); Rock, supra note 98, at 1927.
115. See Coffee, Unstable Coalitions, supra note 99, at 1499-1519.
116. See Rock, supra note 98, at 1927.
117. See Khalil M. Torabzadeh & William J. Bertin, Leveraged Buyouts and
Shareholder Returns, 10 J. FIN. RES. 313, 313-19 (1987) (finding that stockholders of corporations
acquired through successful LBOs from 1982-1985 received significant positive returns).
118. See Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts, 6
REV. FIN. STUD. 959, 979 (1993) (finding that nonconvertible "bondholders experienced significant
wealth losses in successful LBOs of the 1985-1989 period" and that these were representative of debt
losses across the corporate financing structure). One prominent example of how LBOs provide a
windfall to shareholders while harming creditors was seen in the successful LBO of RJR Nabisco in
1989. Following the announcement that RJR Nabisco would be acquired by KKR for a price of
$109/share (a massive premium over the share price before RJR began publicly soliciting LBO bids), the
senior unsecured bonds issued by RJR were downgraded from the investment grade ratings that they had
held. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1505-1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
119. Bratton and Wachter, and Rock, have good summaries of the efforts to improve
corporate governance by better aligning the interests of shareholders and managers. See William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653,
669-75 (2010); Rock, supra note 98, 1911-26 (describing the historical evolution of the shareholder
rights movement and the "waning" of the shareholder agency cost problem).
120. See, e.g., KENNETH BERTSCH & CHRIS MANN, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV.,
CEO COMPENSATION AND CREDIT RISK 5-8 (2005) (finding that equity-based compensation is positively
correlated with credit downgrades and defaults); Elizabeth Strock Bagnani et al., Managers, Owners,
and the Pricing ofRisky Debt: An Empirical Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 453, 461-64 (1994) (finding that bond
yields and managerial ownership are positively correlated); K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Governance
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more closely aligned with shareholders pay a significant premium on bank loans
over other firms.121 As I discuss infra in Section C of this Part, an extensive
literature has arisen examining the ways in which creditors can ameliorate these
agency costs, with negotiated covenants being a primary mechanism.
2. Employee Agency Costs
It may be counterintuitive to think of employees as having an agency cost
problem, as the standard account of the corporation presumes that employees are
themselves agents of their employer, which is thought to be the corporation itself
(and the executives who make its decisions) or the outside investors who are said to
"own" the corporation (although, as aforementioned, this view of shareholders as
singularly "owning" the corporation has come to be largely rejected today).
122
Consequently, most corporate law scholars, viewing corporate law narrowly
through the lens of outside investor interests, typically elide over the agency
conflicts that workers may face in their dealings with the corporation.
However, as Jensen and Meckling describe, under the contractarian view,
employees face their own agency costs in dealing with the corporation. As Kent
Greenfield has stated, these employee agency costs arise "in the sense that
[employees] must depend on the actions of management even though their interests
do not always coincide."'123 As with creditors, employees experience agency
conflicts with managers acting in their own interests but also have agency conflicts
that arise from managerial fealty to shareholders, since employees obviously have
interests that are quite distinct from those of shareholders. For example, employees
prefer that the corporation invest in lower-risk projects, as they have a vested
interest in the corporation's long-term solvency, whereas shareholders care more
Mechanisms and Bond Prices, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1359, 1379-86 (2007) (finding that indicia of
shareholder control (here, the existence of shareholders owning more than 5% of a firm's common
shares) are positively correlated with bond yields where takeover vulnerability is high, indicating that
bond investors require a risk premium to invest in firms that are more closely aligned with
shareholders); Richard A. DeFusco et al., The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders
and Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617, 622-25 (1990) (finding that the announcement of new stock option
grants negatively affects bond prices; Chenyang Wei, Covenant Protection, Credit Spread Dynamics and
Managerial Incentives 20 (Nov. 29, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu!-cwei/JobMarket CovenantsSpreadCEOlncentive ChenyangWei.pdf
(finding that equity-based compensation for CEOs is positively correlated with higher bond yields).
121. See Sudheer Chava et al., Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank
Loans?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2973, 2974 (2009) (finding that corporations with the lowest level of
defenses against shareholder takeovers pay a premium of nearly 25% over firms with the highest level of
such defenses).
122. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85, 92-94 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell eds., 2012). Rock and Wachter are highly critical of this focus on the agency costs of outside
investors, which they argue "leaves corporate law focused entirely on financial transactions that are cut
off from the primary strategic operating transactions of the corporation." Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Laws, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1619, 1628-30 (2001).




about maximizing their returns,124 which is usually understood as maximizing the
corporation's share price. 12
5
Managers can make decisions that directly harm the interests of employees, such
as by lowering wages or eliminating benefits. They can also indirectly harm the
interests of workers by increasing the firm's risk of insolvency, which could result
in a large number of job losses. It is difficult for employees to address these agency
problems, as they typically have steep informational asymmetries 126 and bear high
costs in changing jobs. Moreover, non-unionized employees, who have grown
steadily as a share of the workforce in recent decades, 12 face large collective action
and coordination problems in trying to deal with these agency costs.
There is also a sharp conflict of interest between employees and shareholders.
While there is some overlap in interest, to the extent that both groups want to see
the firm succeed and generate lots of wealth, there are clear tensions when it comes
to allocating those returns, which can foster inefficient rent-seeking behavior. Thus,
employees must be wary of corporate insiders acting on behalf of shareholders.
Indeed, there is evidence that firms, acting on behalf of shareholders, deliberately
take on more debt (and thus increase their risk of insolvency) with the strategic
goal of improving their bargaining position vis-A-vis employees. 129
As John Coffee has described, this is exactly the phenomenon that appeared to
drive the spate of LBOs in the 1980s.130 These LBOs were motivated in large part
by the great amounts of free cash flow that corporations at the time were retaining
(rather than reinvesting or distributing as dividends). 131 Why did corporations keep
such high excess reserves during this period? Theories abound, but one factor may
have been that managers at the time saw themselves as fiduciaries of all corporate
stakeholders, not just of shareholders.132 Thus, keeping free cash flow on hand
satisfied the strong preferences of employees and creditors, as this served as a
124. See Coffee, Unstable Coalitions, supra note 99, at 1499-1500 (describing how
employees have a strong interest in the firm's solvency, which imbues them with a preference for
retaining free cash flow or reinvesting it in low-risk projects, whereas shareholders have  preference for
distributing such free cash flow in the form of dividends or reinvesting it in high-risk, high-return
projects).
125. Of course, the idea that stock price reflects shareholder value maximization
depends critically on Fama's efficient capital markets hypothesis, in which the stock price is seen as
efficiently reflecting all publicly available (and in some formulations, all privately available)
information. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets. A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383, 415 (1970).
126. See Coffee, Unstable Coalitions, supra note 99, at 1521-22; Greenfield, supra
note 123, at 301-02.
127. See ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN
LABOR MARKETS 360 (2003) (stating that labor frictions, including mobility costs, provide employers
with greater market power); Greenfield, supra note 123, at 302.
128. In 1983, the union membership rate among wage and salary workers was 20.1%.
In 2014, the union membership rate was 11.1%. News Release, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., Union
Members-2015 (Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Union Members-2015],
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm.
129. See David A. Matsa, Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable. Evidence from
Collective Bargaining, 65 J. FIN. 1197, 1199-1201 (2010).
130. Coffee, Unstable Coalitions, supra note 99, at 1499-1503, 1521-28.
131. Id. at 1499-1503.
132. Id. at 1501-02.
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buffer against insolvency and a form of insurance that the fixed obligations
promised to these stakeholders (salaries, interest payments, etc.) would be paid in
full. 133 But shareholders, working hand in hand with corporate managers,
"unlocked" additional share value by accepting highly leveraged takeover bids,
which effectively were financed by these uninvested reserves. The results were
catastrophic for employees, as many of these companies were unable to meet theirS 135
increased debt obligations and went insolvent or fired employees to reduce costs.
C. Contractarianism and Shareholder Primacy
What the preceding analysis should illustrate is that corporate law's focus on
shareholder interests is not an obvious outcome under the contractarian view of the
corporation currently in vogue. The idea that the corporation is essentially a web of
contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between corporate stakeholders
should lead one to the clear conclusion that all of the corporation's stakeholders
face potentially high agency costs. As a practical matter, the other inputs that go
into the corporation, whether these are debt financing or simply hard work, are no
less critical to the success of the corporation than is equity capital. So why should
corporate law concern itself primarily with shareholder agency costs while ignoring
the agency costs faced by other stakeholders?
Two main justifications for shareholder primacy are typically given under the
contractarian account of corporate governance. First, the residual claimant status of
shareholders gives them the best incentives to maximize firm value.136 Second,
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. One prominent example of this was the 1986 leveraged buyout of Safeway
led by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), which Susan Faludi famously described in a 1990
Pulitzer Prize-winning story. As Faludi wrote, "The Safeway LBO is often cited as one of the most
successful .... It brought shareholders a substantial premium at the outset, and since then the company
has raised productivity and operating profits and produced riches for the new investors and top
management." Susan C. Faludi, The Reckoning: Safeway LBO Yields Vast Profits but Exacts a Heavy
Human Toll, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1990, http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate
-intelligence/2014/03/05/safeway-buy-out-take-a-trip-down-memory-lane. Existing shareholders reaped
huge benefits, receiving $67.50 per share (an 82% increase over three months), as did management. Id.
KKR also profited immensely from the deal, eventually earning the firm $7.2 billion on an initial
investment of $129 million. See Tom Gara, Safeway Buy-Out? Take a Trip Down Memory Lane, WALL
ST. J.: CORP. INTELLIGENCE BLOG (Mar. 5, 2014, 7:49 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-
intelligence/2014/03/05/safeway-buy-out-take-a-trip-down-memory-lane. But these benefits came
largely at the expense of employees. Sixty-three thousand workers were laid off as a result of the LBO,
typically with no notice and with a severance package of one week's pay per year-of-service (capped at
eight weeks' pay) and two weeks of medical insurance coverage. See Faludi, supra. Those employees
who remained saw their salaries slashed, with average pay dropping from $12.09 per hour in 1986 to
$6.50 per hour in 1988. Id. Job security also became very tenuous, with employees concerned about
"hardball labor policies and high-pressure quota systems." Id. Safeway had long been considered a
worker-friendly employer, but as Faludi notes, shortly after the LBO and the mass firings that
accompanied it, Safeway retired its longtime motto "Safeway Offers Security." Id.
136. Shareholders are differently situated than other stakeholders as far as the type of
claim that they have on the firm's assets. While other stakeholders are generally understood as having a
"fixed claim"-that is, a claim to a fixed dollar amount, whether that is the principal and interest
promised in a loan contract, or the salary promised in an employment contract-shareholders possess
what is called a "residual claim"-a claim to whatever assets are left over after all other obligations have
been paid.
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shareholders are more poorly situated to address agency conflicts through
contractual solutions or the protections of external laws than are non-shareholders.
1. Residual Claimants Have Appropriate Incentives to Maximize Firm
Value
One key argument for shareholder primacy is that shareholders, as residual
claimants who are paid last, are best positioned to maximize value for all of the
corporate constituents. This claim is based on the priority structure of the
corporation's payments. When a corporation invests in a particular business
project, the gains from that project are put into the corporate general treasury and
apportioned based on a legally and contractually defined order of priority
secured creditors typically get paid first; employees and senior unsecured creditors
get paid next; junior unsecured creditors get paid after that; and finally the
shareholders receive what's left the residual claim. Thus, it is argued that
shareholders have the appropriate incentives to ensure that everyone ahead of them
in priority gets paid, since shareholders only receive the residual whatever is left
over. In short, shareholder interests should be prioritized over other interests
because their interests are best aligned with those of all other stakeholders, and thus
shareholder primacy creates the most efficient outcome. 137
2. Non-Shareholder Interests Are Better Protected by Contract or Law
Another justification often given for shareholder primacy is that non-
shareholders are in a better position to protect their interests through contract, due
both to the fixed nature of their claims and the types of relationships they hold withS 138
the corporation. For example, it is pointed out that creditors and employees often
engage in protracted negotiations before settling on a final contract, which is
limited in its duration and promises a defined set of claims; these groups are thus
much more capable of protecting their interests through contract than are
shareholders, who have open-ended, indefinite claims that are not typically
negotiated through contract. 
139
In theory, of course, shareholders could also write contracts to protect their
interests, but it is argued that these transaction costs that is, the costs of writing
and enforcing such contracts would be prohibitively high.140  As residual
137. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.
L. & ECON. 395, 403 (1983).
138. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 69 (2008) [hereinafter NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]; Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 65, at 337-39. See also Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales
for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 23, 25 (1991) [hereinafter Macey, An Economic Analysis] (arguing that shareholder primacy is
justified because shareholders are "the group that faces the most severe set of contracting problems with
respect to defining the nature and extent of the obligations owed to them by officers and directors").
Macey points specifically to poison puts for creditors and golden parachutes for employees as examples
of contractual provisions that more than adequately protect the interests of non-shareholder corporate
constituents. Macey, An Economic Analysis, supra, at 40.
139. See BAINBRIDGE, NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 138, at 69-71.
140. Id. at 64.
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claimants who effectively hold an open-ended contract, shareholders would need to
anticipate all of the potential ways in which corporate insiders could act sub-
optimally, and write contractual provisions for each of these.14 1 These contracts
would invariably be incomplete, as it is impossible to anticipate every possible
future contingency for a contract with an open-ended term.142 Shareholders could
theoretically write contracts accounting for most of the likely contingencies, but
these would be quite costly for shareholders, in a number of ways.143 Such
contracts would necessarily be extremely detailed, with a host of provisions
detailing what corporate managers could and could not do.144 The provisions
involved would be extremely expensive to negotiate, and also to monitor and
enforce.145 Moreover, because such contractual terms would inevitably curtail
profitable activities, they would reduce the firm's potential earnings.146 Assuming
that markets are relatively efficient, shareholders would factor these contracting
costs into their share pricing, and as a result, these costs would be absorbed by non-
shareholders. 147
It is further argued that shareholders face more severe problems of post-
contractual opportunism than do non-shareholders.148 Because non-shareholders
have fixed claims, they can protect against post-contractual misbehavior by
managers through relatively simple "negative control" provisions that prevent
managers from engaging in certain activities, such as employee provisions against
lowering wages or reducing pension benefits, or creditor provisions preventing the
firm from taking on too high a level of debt.149 Conversely, because shareholders
seek wealth maximization, they require optimal behavior by managers and cannot
rely on such negative controls to protect their interests.1
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A related justification for shareholder primacy is that non-shareholders are
better situated to enjoy the protections of external laws. Thus, even if non-
shareholders are not always able to protect their interests through contract,15 1 they
141. Id.
142. Id. In addition to the obvious agency costs involved, incomplete contracts further
raise the problem of post-contractual opportunism. See generally Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
143. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 67, at 323-33; see also Robert F. Scott & George
G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187,
190-92 (2005).
144. Scott & Triantis, supra note 143, at 191-92
145. Id. at 192-94.
146. Id. at 196-98.
147. Id. at 196-198.
148. See Macey, An Economic Analysis, supra note 138, at 24 (stating that "the very
nature of other claimants' interests makes it easier for them to protect against post-contractual
opportunism by the firm"). The general idea here is that firm-specific investments can create quasi-rents,
thus leading to the problem of strategic opportunistic behavior (that may not necessarily lead to an
outright breach of contract) that misappropriates those rents. See also generally Klein et al., supra note
142. For example, a manufacturer that negotiates a contract to build specialized parts for Ford Mustangs
will have to make a specific investment to manufacture these parts according to Ford's specifications,
providing Ford with the opportunity to renegotiate for a lower price in the future. Id. at 308.
149. See Macey, An Economic Analysis, supra note 138, at 36-37.
150. Id. at 36.
151. There is an argument that he high transaction costs involved with contracting
make this an infeasible means of protecting non-shareholder interests. Indeed, in the labor context, it is
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enjoy various legal protections that limit the adverse activities of the firm and thus
reduce the agency conflicts hey might face in their dealings with the corporation
and those who control it. Under this worldview, corporate law should reflect the
interests of shareholders by establishing their interests as priorities in corporate
governance, while non-corporate laws, such as environmental laws and labor laws,
should protect the interests of non-shareholders by limiting the activities that the
corporation can conduct. 1
52
Thus, according to this argument, the existence of external (non-corporate) laws
that either limit the activities the corporation can take on behalf of shareholders or
protect the interests of non-shareholders such as creditors or employees provides
further justification for the claim that corporate law should prioritize shareholder
interests. For example, Stephen Bainbridge asserts that corporate law is an "inapt
tool" for protecting the interests of corporate non-shareholder constituents, as "tort,
contract and property law, as well as a host of general welfare laws, already provide
them with a panoply of protections."5 3 Michael Jensen, in arguing for shareholder
primacy, concedes that there are a number of areas where maximizing value for
shareholders may lead to a suboptimal outcome for corporate stakeholders as a
whole, but argues that government regulation (and not corporate law) is the
appropriate remedy to protect the interests of non-shareholders.154 Jonathan Macey
important to note that the National Labor Relations Act's creation of collective bargaining rights in 1935
was expressly based on the legislative determination that employees face high barriers to bargaining. 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1935) ("The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce ....").
This determination has been subsequently validated by a good deal of empirical and theoretical research
finding that employers typically hold monopsonistic bargaining positions. Manning has a good overview
of the literature and arguments. See ALAN MANNING, supra note 127. MONOPSONY IN MOTION:
IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR MARKETS (2013). As Van Wezel Stone has described, this
inequality in bargaining power is in large part due to the high degree of firm-specific investments made
by workers, which causes them to incur high switching costs should they leave their employer.
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 49-53 (1991). In addition to unequal bargaining power, employees
face a number of other very high transaction costs. They typically have steep informational asymmetries.
See Coffee, Unstable Coalitions, supra note 99, at 1521-1522; Greenfield, supra note 123, at 301-02.
And they suffer from collective bargaining and coordination issues that raise the costs of contracting
significantly. Van Wezel Stone, supra at 56-69. These problems are of course even greater for non-
unionized employees, who have grown steadily as a share of the workforce in recent decades. For
example, in 1983, the union membership rate among wage and salary workers was 20.1%. In 2014, the
union membership rate was 11.1%. Union Members-2015, supra note 128. Other non-shareholder
groups also face high barriers to effective contracting. For example, a long-studied problem in contracts
law has been the structural inequality in bargaining power between firms and consumers. See, e.g.,
Albert H. Choi & George G. Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1665 (2012) (illustrating that bargaining power asymmetries can lead to the formation of
inefficient contracts, insofar as they are not Pareto superior, even with respect to non-price terms).
Consumer bargaining problems are exacerbated by the persistence of consumer mistakes in evaluating
certain types of contract terms, particularly when there is a high degree of heterogeneity and complexity.
See generally Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749
(2008).
152. See Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40
CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 15 (1998).
153. BAINBRIDGE, NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE supra note 138, at 72.
154. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2001).
Yale Journal on Regulation
makes a similar point, in noting that contracts between the corporation and its non-
shareholder constituencies are interpreted and enforced against a legal background
based on the type of contracts at stake; for example, disputes between corporations
and employees are resolved in the context of employment and labor law. 1
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3. Shareholder Primacy as the "Default Rule" of Corporate Ordering
Based on the above justifications for shareholder primacy, advocates of
shareholder primacy have made the normative claim that shareholder primacy
should serve as the "default rule" of corporate private ordering, for two reasons.
156
First, it is argued that shareholder primacy minimizes agency costs, for the reasons
described above. The goal of minimizing corporate agency costs is a non-trivial
concern. An enormous body of research has developed looking into ways to reduce
such agency costs, because they are seen as a significant drag on capital
formation.15 7 Thus, the claim that shareholder primacy most efficiently reduces
agency costs provides an important rationale for the prioritization of shareholder
interests.
Second, it is asserted that shareholder primacy reflects the outcome that
corporate stakeholders would agree to under most circumstances, if there were no
transaction costs. While the transaction costs involved with corporate activity make
actual contracts untenable, the idea of a hypothetical contract without transaction
costs has been instrumental for helping corporate law and economics scholars
explore the boundaries and problems of agency costs, and how various features of
corporate governance might help minimize those agency costs. Because
shareholders are best situated to serve the interests of all corporate stakeholders,
and because they are least protected by alternative mechanisms uch as contract or
external laws, it is argued that shareholder primacy would typically be the result of
any such hypothetical bargain.
Thus, the shareholder primacy norm is described as "both normative and
positive: that corporate law should take this form; and that it 'almost always'
155. Macey, An Economic Analysis at supra note 138, at 39-41.
156. The term "default rule" refers to a contractual term provided by law that
"govern[s] in the absence of contrary agreement"-in other words, a mutable rule that parties can
contract around by express agreement. Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Default rules are
meant to fill in the gaps in an incomplete contract with the terms that most private parties would choose
under most circumstances and thus serve to operate efficiently as the operative contractual term. Default
rules are contrasted with "mandatory" or "immutable" rules that cannot be discarded by the voluntary
agreement of contractual counterparties. Id.
157. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (analyzing the use of
incentive-based compensation as a means for lowering agency costs); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986) (looking into how fiduciary duties might mitigate
agency costs); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980) (exploring the managerial employment market and its informational asymmetries as a reason for
lower agency costs); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26
J. L & ECON. 327 (1983) (looking into whether incentive structures that encourage mutual monitoring by
managers may reduce agency costs); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (describing how the threat of corporate takeovers can reduce agency costs).
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does."'15 8 It is normative in that it provides important policy justifications for
prioritizing the interests of shareholders over other corporate stakeholders.
159
Corporate law should enable and facilitate private ordering, providing the default
rules that work best for most corporate stakeholders, but allow stakeholders to
contract around these rules if doing so is in their interest. In this way, corporate law
promotes efficient capital formation. As Bainbridge has described it, "The basic
thesis of the hypothetical bargaining methodology is that by providing the rule to
which the parties would agree if they could bargain ... society facilitates private
ordering."'
The shareholder primacy norm is said to be descriptive insofar as it well
describes the particular characteristics of corporate law. 161 The fact that the various
features of shareholder primacy are so ubiquitous and dominant in corporate law is
itself used as evidentiary support of the normative arguments for shareholder
primacy in corporate law. Because states are competing with one another for
corporate charters, it is argued that efficient corporate law terms those that reflect
the default rules of corporate ordering should, in theory, win out over time.
162
Under this logic, the durability and ubiquity of certain terms that prioritize
shareholder interests in corporate law among the fifty states is offered in support of
the claim that shareholder primacy reflects the default rules of corporate
ordering.163 This view of corporate law as a "race to the top" is also buttressed by
empirical evidence that shareholders require a premium to invest in the securities of
corporations based in states that have less robust shareholder primacy,164 although
it should be noted that these results are skewed by the importance of Delaware
corporate law (which emphasizes trong shareholder primacy). 1
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158. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 783 (2006).
159. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860
(1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence F. Mitchell ed., 1995)) ("The nexus of
contracts model has important implications for a range of corporate law topics, the most obvious of
which is the debate over the proper role of mandatory legal rules.").
160. BAINBRIDGE, NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 138, at 35.
161. Of course, corporate law is created by state legislatures and state courts in the
United States. This generates "competition" between the fifty states, which arguably facilitates the
creation of efficient corporate laws, insofar as corporate investors can reward or penalize firms that are
incorporated in certain states by demanding higher or lower premiums (or choosing not to invest) based
on the particular legal features of the incorporating state's corporate law system. See, e.g., William J.
Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997).
162. See Carney, supra note 162; Daniel R. Fischel, The "'Race to the Bottom"
Revisited. Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913
(1982); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709
(1987); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
163. See BAINBRIDGE, NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 138, at 35-36.
164. Id.
165. See generally Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J.
FIN. ECON. 525 (2001) (noting that the majority of public corporations are incorporated in Delaware,
thus giving it an outsized impact on corporate law in the United States). Of course, there are many who
vehemently disagree with the view that the competition for corporate charters creates a race to the top,
and instead argue that this creates a "race to the bottom." See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105
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III. Corporate Political Activity and Non-Shareholder Agency Costs
Agency costs created by corporate political activity for non-shareholders have
not yet been studied. In this Part, I make two arguments. First, I illustrate that
corporate political activity can create agency costs for non-shareholders, reviewing
some of the literature on the effect of legal changes on creditor and employee
interests, and reviewing several real world examples of how CPA performed on
behalf of shareholders negatively impacted non-shareholder interests. Second, I
argue that these non-shareholder agency costs can be quite substantial.
A. Corporate Political Activity Can Create Agency Costs for Non-Shareholders
Corporate political activity raises new agency problems for non-shareholders, in
addition to the ones that they already face in corporate governance. Unfortunately,
there is a dearth of research on the agency costs of CPA for non-shareholders, as
this issue has not yet been addressed in the literature. But as the previous sections
describe, it is clear that there are often sharp conflicts between the interests of
different corporate stakeholders. Thus, non-shareholders may face many of the
same managerial agency problems as shareholders. Brudney's example of the racist
and sexist CEO who uses the corporation's Treasury funds to help pass legislation
allowing race- and sex-based discrimination, described supra in Part 1.B, is not
only divergent from the interests of shareholders, but also from the interests of
other corporate stakeholders. But non-shareholders also face a potential divergence
of interests with shareholders as well, and thus face an additional layer of agency
conflicts to the extent that shareholder interests are emphasized in corporate
governance, as they are today.16 6 Using Brudney's example, if we posit a racist and
sexist CEO, backed by the full support of racist and sexist shareholders, using
corporate resources to back legislation allowing it to discriminate, this scenario
would not necessarily create agency costs for assenting shareholders, but would
potentially create agency costs for dissenting non-shareholders.
A number of studies demonstrating the importance of legal and regulatory
changes to non-shareholder interests seem to support this point. When legislation is
passed that increases the bargaining power of workers, corporations respond by• , \ 167
reducing their leverage (and thus their risk of insolvency). Stronger legal
HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Indeed, those who argue the "race to the bottom" hypothesis have
pointed to the proliferation of state antitakeover laws, including in Delaware, as strong empirical
evidence in support of their view, since these statutes clearly do not benefit shareholders. See Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA.
L. REV. 111 (2001); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race
to Protect Managers From Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999). But see Roberta Romano,
Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843,
855-59 (1993) (arguing that Delaware's reluctance to adopt an antitakeover statute that was considerably
weaker than other states' supports the claim that competition between the states does benefit
shareholders).
166. See generally Rock, supra note 98.
167. Elena Simintzi et al., Labor Protection and Leverage, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 561,
561 (2015) (finding that legislative reforms increasing employment protection are associated with a 187
basis point reduction in leverage).
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protections for labor are associated with lower bond yields, due at least in part to
lower investments in risky activities, and lower rates of outside acquisition, which
debt investors view as beneficial for firm solvency. 168 Stronger labor protections
are also correlated with a higher cost of equity, suggesting that shareholders may
view these as limiting their ability to maximize profits. A similar dynamic is
found with creditor rights, as legal protections enhancing creditor rights in
bankruptcy or otherwise are associated with lower risk-taking by firms.170 To the
extent that corporate political activity can effectuate legal and regulatory changes, it
creates a costly agency problem for non-shareholders.
The idea that CPA can exacerbate agency conflicts for non-shareholders is not
merely a theoretical proposition. Below, I briefly describe several examples of how
CPA that has benefited shareholders has harmed non-shareholder interests. These
examples largely illustrate CPA as a form of risk-shifting from shareholders to
other stakeholders, and indeed, much of the creditor-shareholder and employee-
shareholder conflict is based in such risk-shifting, but these examples are meant to
be merely illustrative.
1. Example 1: Financial Deregulation
The schism between shareholder and creditor interests in CPA is probably most
starkly illustrated in the case of financial institutions. Because banks are so highly
leveraged, and because their profitability is so directly tied to the amount of risk
and leverage they take on, the conflict between shareholders and creditors i
particularly extreme in banking. There is a well-developed literature on this
subject. 17 1 Financial institutions are heavily regulated, with the primary focus of
this regulation being to limit the amount of risk that these firms can take on in their
investments. Because of these strong regulatory restrictions on risk-taking, there
168. See Huafong Jason Chen et al., Do Nonfinancial Stakeholders Affect the Pricing
of Risky Debt?. Evidence From Unionized Workers, 16 REV. FIN. 347, 347 (2012) (finding that
corporations operating in more unionized industries have lower bond yields). But see Blaylock et al.,
supra note 99, at 325 (finding that, in the Chrysler bankruptcy, which affected numerous firms, those
corporations in more unionized industries experienced higher bond yields following the government's
intervention, illustrating the agency costs between creditors and employees in insolvent firms).
169. See generally Huafong Jason Chen et al., Labor Unions, Operating Flexibility,
and the Cost of Equity, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 25 (2011).
170. Viral A. Acharya et al., Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-Taking, 102 J. FIN.
ECON. 150, 151-52 (2011).
171. See, e.g., A. Sinan Cebenoyan et al., Deregulation, Reregulation, Equity
Ownership, and S&L Risk-Taking, 24 FIN. MGMT. 63, 63 (1995) (finding that savings and loans with a
high concentration of managerial stock ownership took on greater risk); A. Sinan Cebenoyan et al.,
Ownership Structure, Charter Value, and Risk-Taking Behavior for Thrifts, 28 FIN. MGMT. 43, 43
(1999); Gary Gorton & Richard Rosen, Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of
Banking, 50 J. FIN. 1377, 1377 (1995); Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk
Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449, 449 (1974) (analyzing changes in the pricing of debt based on
changes in the firm's risk profile); Anthony Saunders et al., Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and
Bank Risk Taking, 45 J. FIN. 643, 643 (1990); Smith & Warner, supra note 107.
172. This "safety and soundness" regulation relies heavily on capital requirements,
but also emphasizes other regulatory mechanisms, particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis and
the regulatory overhaul that followed. I describe these regulations in greater detail in a previous Article.
David Min, How Government Guarantees Promote Housing Finance Stability, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
437, 471-72 (2013).
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is a sharp opposition between the political interests of bank shareholders, whose
preference is to loosen bank risk regulations so that they can increase their expected
returns, and bank creditors, who want to maintain a high level of such regulation to
protect bank solvency and the value of their investments. 173
For a number of reasons, financial firms have tended to be closely aligned with
the political interests of shareholders.174 Moreover, the financial services industry
has been extremely active in trying to influence the political process. Since at least
the 1960s, banks have been lobbying to loosen the New Deal-era restrictions on
their business.175 The financial services industry spent $1.2 billion on corporate
political activity between January 1, 2013 and November 16, 2014,176 and is by far
the largest single source of corporate political spending in the United States.
177
Between 1999 and 2008, the industry spent $2.7 billion in reported federal
lobbying expenses and contributed more than $1 billion in campaign
contributions.1 8 While it is difficult, due to the complexity and opacity of the
political process, to empirically demonstrate a causal relationship between CPA
and regulatory changes, a wide array of observers have concluded that the financial
173. Of course, during bank runs and financial panics, the political interests of
creditors and shareholders converge, insofar as both want increased liquidity and guarantees
(collectively often described as bailouts) from the government. See generally David Min, Understanding
the Failures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421 (2015).
174. Among the drivers of this closer alignment of shareholder and manager interests
were various measures meant to improve corporate governance. Bratton and Wachter, and Rock, have
good summaries of these efforts. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. As Coffee describes,
the evidence emerging from the 2008 financial crisis indicates that the high degree of incentive-based
compensation did align managerial interests with shareholder interests and that the high degree of risk
that banks took on prior to the financial crisis was consistent with shareholder preferences. John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank. Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and
Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1051-56 (2012).
175. See MATTHEW SHERMAN, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL'Y RES., A SHORT HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2009). It is difficult to empirically measure how
financial firms spend on CPA, because this data is largely unreported. That being said, there is
significant reason to believe that these expenditures were unidirectional in pushing for deregulation and
regulatory forbearance on risk-related regulation. For example, Igan and Mishra found "strong
evidence" that political spending by the financial services industry was associated with the probability of
a legislator changing to a deregulatory stance. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, Three's Company: Wall
Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street at 20 (IMF Working Paper, 2011). Igan et al. found that CPA by
financial institutions was associated with greater risk-taking from 2000-2007, and with worse outcomes
in 2008. Deniz Igan et al., A Fistful of Dollars. Lobbying and the Financial Crisis, in 26 NBER
MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 195, 195-97 (Jonathan A. Parker & Michael Woodford eds., 2011). Simon
Johnson, the former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, has described the financial
services industry's "enormous political weight" as being a primary factor behind the "river of
deregulatory policies" that were implemented between the 1980s and 2000s. Simon Johnson, The Quiet
Coup.- How Bankers Took Power and How They're Impeding Recovery, THE ATLANTIC, May 2009,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/307364.
176. Wall Street Money in Washington, AM. FOR FIN. REFORM 1, 4 (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/blogs/wp-
content/ourfinancialsecurity.org/uploads/2014/07/WallStreetMoneyDec2ol4.pdf; see also Doric
Apollonio et al., Access and Lobbying. Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm, 36 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 13, 50 tbl.3 (2008) (noting that the financial services sector was the largest source of lobbying
expenditures in 2006, spending $259 million).
177. See 2014 Overview. Totals by Sector, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL.,
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/sectors.php.
178. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xvii
(2011).
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services industry's outsized efforts to influence lawmakers and regulators were a
main driver in the extensive deregulation and regulatory forbearance of the
financial services industry observed during the 1990s and 2000s. 179
Beginning in 1980, Congress responded with a series of increasingly sweeping
changes to banking regulation. These included: the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which loosened portfolio
restrictions on thrift institutions and preempted state usury laws;180 the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which essentially eliminated
portfolio restrictions on thrift institutions and removed interest rate caps on
deposits;181 the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994, which removed geographic and branching restrictions on banks;182 the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which eliminated Glass-Steagall prohibitions on
bank ownership or affiliation with securities and insurance companies; 183 and the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), which exempted a broad
class of over-the-counter derivatives from most forms of regulatory oversight. 1
84
Federal banking regulators also responded to political lobbying. In some cases
they looked the other way, as with their refusal to block the Citigroup-Travelers
merger in 1998185 or their failure to issue predatory lending standards during the
subprime mortgage boom.18 6 In other cases, they affirmatively wrote rules and
regulations that allowed banks to take on greater risk. For example, the Federal
Reserve's 1996 guidance allowed bank holding companies to diversify into
investment banking activities.18 7 In 1998, bank regulators failed to block the
proposed merger of Citigroup with Travelers Insurance.188 In 2004, the Securities
and Exchange Commission created the "Consolidated Supervised Entity" program,
179. For example, Simon Johnson has described the financial services industry's
"enormous political weight" as being so influential as to have "effectively captured" the U.S. federal
government. Johnson, supra note 176.
180. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also Min,
supra note 173, at 452-53.
181. Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also Min, supra note
173, at 452-53.
182. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also Mark D.
Rollinger, Interstate Banking and Branching Under the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
183 (1996).
183. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). For a detailed account of some of the changes
created by Gramm-Leach-Bliley, see Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1222-32 (2002).
184. Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Star. 2763
(2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
185. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and
Regulatory Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 75 (2013) (describing how federal regulators gave positive
signals to Citigroup and Travelers to merge, thereby putting pressure on Congress to change the law so
as to make the merger retroactively legal).
186. See generally Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization:
The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1344-47 (2009).
187. See SHERMAN, supra note 176, at 9.
188. Id. at 9-10.
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which provided optional prudential regulatory oversight for the holding companies
of broker-dealers facing more stringent prudential oversight in Europe unless they
had U.S. oversight. 1 9 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's 2005 rule
preempted state anti-predatory lending laws. 1
90
Banking deregulation was widely blamed for causing the savings and loan crisis
of the late 1980s and early 1990s.19 1 Nearly two decades later, banking
deregulation was blamed for the massive financial crisis we experienced in 2008.
As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the body authorized by Congress to
investigate the causes of the financial crisis, stated:
We conclude widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to
the stability of the nation's financial markets .... More than 30 years of deregulation and
reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions, championed by former Federal Reserve
chairman Alan Greenspan and others, supported by successive administrations and
Congresses, and actively pushed by the powerful financial industry at every turn, had stripped
away key safeguards, which could have helped avoid catastrophe.
1 9
2
Of course, the very high levels of risk that banking deregulation allowed ultimately
resulted in large losses for shareholders and creditors alike.193 But from an ex ante
perspective, the decision to take on greater risk was one that benefited bank
shareholders, as I described in Part II.B.1.1 94 Shareholders themselves certainly
seemed to believe that higher bank risk was valuable. As Bratton and Wachter
describe, the stock prices of banks that took on higher leverage during the pre-crisis
period "handsomely outperformed the market as a whole,"'195 while banks that took
on more conservative strategies saw their stock prices lag significantly behind. 196 In
other words, shareholders applauded the CPA that led to the deregulation of risk
constraints on banks and other financial institutions, and the greater risk this
allowed. Conversely, creditors lost enormous sums of money, even with the
massive bailouts provided by the federal government. 197
189. See Office of Inspector Gen., SEC's Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related
Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, (Sept. 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf.
190. See McCoy et al., supra note 187, at 1348-51.
191. See Min, supra note 173, at 452-54.
192. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 179, at xviii.
193. Of course, many creditor losses were effectively transferred to taxpayers as a
result of a wave of government bailouts. One could argue that the CPA done on behalf of banks to
deregulate the industry was not contrary to the interests of creditors, given creditor expectations that
they might be rescued. But as I have pointed out, the argument that creditors expected to be bailed out
ignores the significant uncertainty about whether and to what extent a particular class of creditors might
be insulated against loss. See Min, Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline, supra 173, at 1473-
74. Moreover, this claim is not supported by the pricing and liquidity changes we observed prior to and
during the financial crisis. In fact, SIFI liabilities experienced a high degree of price volatility, indicating
that creditors were quite concerned about credit losses. Id.
194. See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
195. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 119, at 717.
196. Id. at 720-21.
197. It is difficult to estimate exactly how large creditors' losses from the 2008 crisis
might have been, as government bailouts by the United States, the Bank of England, the European
Central Bank, and various European national governments effectively transferred many of these losses
from bank creditors to taxpayers. One measure that might be used is the size of government bailouts,
which in the United States totaled $3 trillion at its peak, and perhaps much more than that, if we
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2. Example 2: Enron
The spectacular failure of Enron is generally told as a story of accounting fraud
and shareholder agency problems: opportunistic managers and directors, seeking to
maximize their incentive-based compensation, utilized complex and fraudulent
accounting methods (alongside complicit auditors) to conceal massive and growing
losses that ultimately cost the U.S. economy an estimated $64 billion in 2002.198
But underneath that story lies another important narrative of non-shareholder
agency costs, particularly as they relate to CPA. Enron was so successful and
importantly, returned enormous value to its shareholders for most of its history
because it was extremely effective in using its general treasury funds to convince
politicians and regulators to change the laws in ways that were beneficial to its
shareholders but not for its other stakeholders. The successful CPA employed by
Enron radically altered the regulatory landscape for energy companies and allowed
Enron to expand rapidly and take on enormous amounts of risk. This marked a
stark change from the staid, boring, and highly regulated activities in which energy
companies could engage before Enron came on the scene.
Enron was deeply involved in political activity almost since its first days.
Enron's extensive CPA began in the early 1990s. It was one of the major lobbyists
behind the successful push to pass the Energy Policy Act of 1992,199 which created
a new category of power plants that were exempt from the Public Utility Holding
Company Act's provisions restricting energy companies from geographic
expansion and affiliations.20 The passage of the Energy Policy Act was critical to
Enron's early success, as it allowed the company to utilize the holding company
structure to expand quickly, both in terms of its geographic presence and its lines of
business. Within two years, Enron was the largest buyer and seller of natural gas in
North America and the leader in electrical power trading.201 Enron continued to
lobby aggressively for increased deregulation, and established itself as one of the
most aggressive and influential corporate political spenders in America. Between
1997 and 2000, Enron and its employees spent $10.2 million in federal political
expenditures.202 This included contributions of $736,800 to President George W.
consider the capacity of the various lender-of-last resort facilities utilized by the Fed. See Mark Adelson,
The Deeper Causes of the Financial Crisis: Mortgages Alone Cannot Explain It, 39 J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT. 16, 19-20 (2013). Another way to measure losses i  to look at total write-downs made by the
financial sector, which was estimated to be some $3.6 trillion. Id. at 18. In 2009, the credit rating agency
Moody's looked at the bonds it had rated, and determined that there were approximately $281 billion in
defaults on those bonds, with nearly 80% of those defaults coming from the banking and finance sectors.
MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., CORPORATE DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES, 1920-2009, at 5 (2009),
https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/DefaultResearch/2007400000578875.pdf.
198. See, e.g., Beth Arnold & Paul de Lange, Enron: An Examination of Agency
Problems, 15 CRITICAL PERSP. ON ACCT. 751 (2004).
199. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 2795 (1992)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13201).
200. Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron:
Corporate (Re)regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 85 (2005).
201. Id. at 85-86.
202. Pratap Chatterjee, Enron: Pulling the Plug on the Global Power Broker,
CORPWATCH (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id 1016.
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Bush, 3 as well as contributions to the campaigns of seventy-one U.S. SenatorsS 204
and 188 members of the House of Representatives. Enron also spent heavily on
federal lobbying. While it is unclear exactly how much it spent on this effort, in
2001 it spent over $3 million on registered federal lobbyists alone, a figure that
almost certainly represents the tip of a very large iceberg.
205
Enron was also a huge political player at the state level, lobbying politicians and
regulators in at least twenty-eight states from 1997 to 2000.206 This included more
than $1.9 million in campaign contributions to over 700 candidates for state office
and a far greater sum on lobbying expenses.207 For example, Enron spent more than
$345,000 on lobbying expenses in California and as much as $945,000 on lobbying
expenses in Texas, in a successful effort to convince those two states to deregulate
their energy markets.208 Ultimately, Enron was successful in convincing twenty-
four states to adopt some form of energy deregulation.209 While it is usually
difficult to attribute a causal relationship between political lobbying and legislative
changes, because of the aggressiveness of Enron's lobbying, the deregulation that
occurred at the state level was widely attributed to Enron, and Enron alone.2 10 As
one prominent expert observed, "Enron was the only company out there lobbying
and they were everywhere .... They not only carried a lot of water for themselves.
But they carried water for the rest of the industry."
' 211
Finally, Enron played a critical role in shaping and passing CFMA, which laid
out guidelines for the regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. 212CFMA
was drafted following the massive and sudden failure of the hedge fund Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM), which had relied heavily on OTC derivatives to
carry out its investment strategy. Because of the opacity of OTC derivatives,
regulators and investors were not aware of the extent to which LTCM was
203. MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, 107TH CONG., BUSH
ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS WITH ENRON 1 (Comm. Print 2002).
204. See STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES:
MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 194-95 (2015).
205. MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, supra note 204, at 2. As this
staff report notes, the methodology they used "is likely to underestimate significantly" the total amount
of federal lobbying expenditures made by Enron. Id. Moreover, lobbying disclosures underestimate the
many ways in which lobbying expenditures actually occur, as "public relations" and "media relations"
expenditures often serve the same purposes as lobbying, but are not disclosed as such. For example, the
American Petroleum Institute disclosed slightly more than $7 million in lobbying expenditures in 2012,
but it spent far more than this on other activities meant to further their advocacy goals, including
payments of $85.5 million to four public relations and advertising firms. See Erin Quinn, The
Misinformation Industry, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Jan. 15, 2015,
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2 1 5/0 /1 5/1 6596/who-needs-lobbyists-see-what-big-business-spends-
win-american-minds.
206. See Leslie Wayne, Enron's Many Strands. The Politics; Enron, Preaching








212. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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leveraged or posed systemic risk. In response to LTCM's failure, many
policymakers sought to regulate OTC derivatives to ensure more disclosure and
transparency.213 Enron was a big player in all sorts of OTC derivatives, which
allowed them to speculate on electricity prices, the influence of the weather, or
whether a particular company or investment pool would remain solvent.214 Enron
sought to head off stricter regulation of its derivatives trading activities by heavily
lobbying Congress, and especially Senator Phil Gramm, who represented Enron's
home state of Texas and sat as chair of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs. 215 Enron sought to pass a bill that would not contain
the more stringent oversight requirements being proposed and would exempt most
of Enron's derivatives trading from regulation.
216
This bill ultimately became CFMA, and was tailored to the interests of Enron's
executives. Indeed, at one point, Enron appears to have successfully convinced
Senator Gramm to back off of some of his own legislative priorities to help ensure
that CFMA would be enacted before the end of the legislative calendar year.217 The
bill did get passed out of Congress and signed before the end of the year, and it
exempted broad swaths of derivatives trading from oversight, including two classes
of transactions that were an important part of Enron's business bilateral
derivatives trades that are executed over the counter, not on a trading facility, and
trades made on an electronic trading facility involving exempt commodities, a, • • 218
category that included most energy derivatives. This exemption became known
as the "Enron Loophole" due to Enron's clear influence in getting it passed into
law, and because Enron was the most obvious beneficiary of this exemption at the
211
time.
As with the Energy Policy Act, the passage of CFMA was critical to Enron's
growth and revenues, at least for the next year. CFMA allowed Enron to continue
to trade aggressively in OTC derivatives. These derivatives were central to Enron's
growth and revenues. 22 In 2000 alone, Enron's exposure to OTC derivatives
increased five-fold.221 That year, Enron reported gains of $7.2 billion on its
derivatives trading, which appears to have been the result of very high leverage.
222
Shareholders appear to have valued Enron's political activities and the increased
risk that CFMA allowed Enron to take on. As Enron was actively lobbying Senator
213. Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, Enron Lobbied Hard to Limit Oversight of




217. See Eric Lipton, Gramm and the 'Enron Loophole, 'N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/business/17grammside.html.
218. See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON
LOOPHOLE 1 (2008).
219. Id; see also Lipton, supra note 218.
220. See generally Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON AND
OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER 169 (Nancy B. Rapoport et al. eds.,
2009) (stating that Enron was "at its core" a derivatives trading firm, and that by the 2000s, its OTC
derivatives trading activities dwarfed its other business activities).
221. Id. at 170.
222. Id. at 184.
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Gramm to help ensure passage of CFMA in the summer of 2000, Enron's stock
soared, rising from a low of $42.50 earlier that year to its all-time high of $90.00
per share in August 2000.2 23 President Bill Clinton signed the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act into law in late December 2000; Enron stocked closed out the
year with a stock price of $83.13 per share.
224
As we all learned less than a year later, Enron's derivatives activities were
central to its fraudulent efforts to hide its growing losses.225 But to focus only on
the fraud is to miss the real story of Enron's failures. Enron was heavily leveraged
and exposed to high levels of risk from both its derivatives speculation and its core
energy business activities.22 6 As Bill Bratton describes, a "conventional market
reversal" that caused losses in Enron's core energy business was a key factor in
Enron's demise, and this was exacerbated by Enron's speculative derivatives
activities.227 The extraordinarily high degree of leverage was largely responsible
for the suddenness of Enron's downfall, as Enron experienced something akin to a
bank run.2 28 Enron's accounting fraud was part of this story, certainly, insofar as it
pumped up Enron's earnings and created an enormous credibility problem among
investors that hastened Enron's collapse.229 But the accounting fraud alone appears
insufficient to have caused the massive insolvency that occurred.
230
Importantly, focusing on Enron's accounting fraud leads observers to the wrong
conclusion about Enron's agency problems. Enron is often held up as an example
of shareholder agency costs, because managers misled shareholders through a
massive accounting fraud. An Economist editorial from 2002 captures the basic
lesson that most leaders and policy experts seem to have taken away from Enron:
The Enron fiasco has shown that all is not well with the governance of many big American
companies. Over the years all sorts of checks and balances have been created to insure that
company bosses, who supposedly act as agents for shareholders, their principals, actually do
so .... It is time for another effort to realign the system to function more in shareholders'
interests."1
223. Enron Historical Stock Price, UNIV. MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY SCH. OF LAW,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/enron/enronstockchart.pdf.
224. Id.
225. Partnoy, supra note 221, at 173-81.
226. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1299-1332 (2002) [hereinafter Bratton, Enron].
227. Id. at 1299-1305.
228. Id. at 1320-25.
229. Id. at 1305-20.
230. Id. at 1319-20, 1326-32 (stating that the size of the accounting fraud, as reflected
in Enron's restated earnings, was "not large enough to bring down Enron, taken alone," and pointing out
that all of the described factors, including the high leverage, the market downturn in energy production
and delivery, Enron's high exposure to derivatives speculation, and its accounting fraud, were key parts
of Enron's failure).
231. The Lessons From Enron: After the Energy Firm's Collapse, the Entire Auditing
Regime Needs Radical Change, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 2002, http://www.economist.com/node/976011; see
also Beth Arnold & Paul de Lange, Enron: An Examination of Agency Problems, 15 CRIT. PERSP. ON
ACCT. 751, 763-64 (2004) (providing an example of how academics also understood the key lesson from
Enron's collapse to be the need for corporate governance reform to address shareholder agency costs).
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This prevailing wisdom on the lessons of Enron misses the key point that, up
until August 2001, the outsized risk and massive leverage taken on by Enron was
beneficial to shareholders. Had Enron's basic business continued to perform well,
or had its derivatives activities generated higher revenues in 2001, Enron might
have continued to generate high returns for its shareholders, just as it had done for
the previous decade. It was the confluence of Enron's business problems, bad
speculative bets, and high leverage that brought the accounting fraud to the
forefront. But the high risk and high leverage that actually caused Enron's losses
were in line with shareholder interests and in opposition to non-shareholder
interests .2 3 2
From an ex ante perspective, it is clear that shareholders approved of Enron's
extensive CPA, which unlocked markets for Enron, opened the door to acquisitions
and growth, and allowed the company to take on higher amounts of leverage and
risk than would otherwise be possible. Enron shareholders made money hand over
fist, until August 2001. Moreover, it was also clear that Enron's corporate culture
was one that could be accurately described as obsessed with shareholder value
maximization, as illustrated by a famous story about Enron's CEO, Jeffrey Skilling,
when he was a Harvard Business School student:
Skilling was asked what he would do if his company were producing a product that might
cause harm-or even death-to the customers that used it . . . . Skilling replied, "I'd keep
making and selling the product. My job as a businessman is to be a profit center and to
maximize return to the shareholders. It's the government's job to step in if a product is
dangerous."
'
Indeed, it seems clear that Enron's extensive measures to disguise its true
financial condition were intended more to preserve the company's AAA credit
rating, which was critical to the massive leverage that Enron utilized, than to pump
up the stock price.234 As Enron increasingly grew to look like a financial
intermediary, with its revenues coming primarily from derivatives speculation and
investment activities, its creditworthiness became critical to its activities. As
Bratton notes, "To lose the [investment grade credit rating] is to lose the derivatives
business, as counterparties take their business risks to a shop able to enter into
derivatives contracts entailing no significant default risk."235 In this light, it appears
that Enron's fraud was undertaken to benefit shareholders, by allowing the
company to double down on maintaining its share price through duping unwitting
creditors.
232. Id. As a Businessweek postmortem article noted: "The seeds of [Enron's]
destruction were planted well before the [discovery of Enron's accounting problems]. According to
former insiders and other sources close to Enron, it was already on shaky financial ground from a slew
of bad investments, including overseas projects ranging from a water business in England to a power
distributor in Brazil. 'You make enough billion-dollar mistakes, and they add up,' says one source close
to Enron's top executives." Wendy Zellner & Stephanie Anderson Forest, The Fall of Enron,
BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 16, 2001, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2001-12-16/the-fall-of-enron.
233. PETER C. FUSARO & Ross M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON:
EVERYONE'S GUIDE TO THE LARGEST BANKRUPTCY IN U.S. HISTORY 28 (2002).
234. See Bratton, Enron, supra note 227, at 1320-25.
235. Id. at 1324.
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Non-shareholders, especially employees and creditors, suffered most from
Enron's overreach. In the immediate aftermath of Enron's financial woes, and just
ahead of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, the price on Enron's bonds, formerly
investment grade, dropped to a low of $0.16 on the dollar, while the price of its
bank loans dropped to a low of $0.18 on the dollar.2 36 Enron's unsecured creditors
ultimately received about 53% of their par value, reflecting a loss of tens of billions
of dollars.23 7 Enron employees also suffered tremendously, with 5,000 workers
losing their jobs and most of their pension and retirement benefits.
Enron's significant investments in CPA demonstrate some of the serious agency
conflicts between shareholders and non-shareholders. Enron's political activities
reflected exactly what shareholders should theoretically want they changed the
regulatory landscape in which Enron operated to allow the company to take on
much more risk than they otherwise would have been allowed. This improved the
net expected returns of shareholders, and for nearly a decade, returned enormous
actual share value as well. At the same time, this CPA and the heightened risk of
insolvency that it created was detrimental to the interests of employees and
creditors, both ex post but also ex ante.
3. Example 3: The Leveraged Buyout of TXU
The 2007 leveraged buyout of TXU, another Texas energy company, provides
an additional stark example of how CPA performed on behalf of shareholders can
harm other corporate stakeholders, including creditors and employees. The $45
billion acquisition of TXU, led by the private equity funds Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts (KKR) and TPG (formerly the Texas Pacific Group), as well as the
investment bank Goldman Sachs, was the largest LBO in history at the time.238
This deal, like all LBOs, was heavily funded by debt. The deal financing saddled
the new company, called Energy Future Holdings (EFH), with over $38 billion in
long-term debt.239
The terms of the deal were quite favorable for shareholders, with the proposed
acquisition price representing a 15% premium over the outstanding market value of
TXU shares.2 40 But these terms were also very unfavorable for other stakeholders,
236. See Gregory Zuckerman, Enron Bonds Climb as 'Vultures'Detect Value Among
the Ruins, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2001.
237. See Linda Sandier, Enron Creditors Get 53 Percent Payout, Aided by Lawsuit
Accords, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 13, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012
-01-13/enron-creditors-pocket-21-8-billion-in-cash-stock-i-.
238 See Record Buyout for TXU, CNN, Feb. 26, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/02/26/news/companies/txu/?postversion 2007022608; TXU Corp.
Announces Completion of Acquisition By Investors Led By KKR and TPG, KKR MEDIA CTR., Oct. 10,
2007, http://media.kkr.com/media/media releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID 332996; Mitchell Schnurman,
Why TXU Corp. Was a Bad Bet, D CEO, Oct. 2012, http://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d
-ceo/2012/october/why-txu-corp-was-a-bad-bet.
239 See Elizabeth Souder, Energy Future Holdings Owners Stuck With Company Worth Less Than They
Paid 5 Years Ago, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 26, 2012,
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/20120526-energy-future-holdings-owners-stuck-with
-company-worth-less-than-they-paid-5-years-ago.ece.




most notably existing creditors. The high degree of leverage involved in this
acquisition caused existing TXU debt investors to experience a significant and
immediate decline in the value of their investments. Upon the announcement of this
acquisition, the cost of purchasing credit default swaps protecting against credit
losses on TXU bonds doubled.241 A wide variety of TXU debt offerings saw their
risk premiums soar correspondingly.42 Shortly after the announcement of this deal
in late February 2007, Fitch downgraded TXU senior unsecured debt from BBB-
minus (its lowest investment grade rating) by one notch to BB-plus. 3 Moody's
and S&P, the other major credit rating agencies, stated at that time that they were
considering downgrading TXU debt due to the proposed LBO;244 both firms did
indeed downgrade the credit ratings on the debt issued by TXU and its subsidiaries
and affiliates later that year. 245 By May 2007, TXU investment-grade bonds due in
2024 were trading at only $0.87 on the dollar.
24 6
These harms to creditors were hardly unforeseeable. Indeed, only two years
earlier, KKR had led a group of investors proposing a leveraged buyout of
Unisource Energy, the holding company that owned Tucson Electric, an energy
utility in Arizona.24 7 Arizona regulators rejected this deal based on concerns about
the high levels of debt, the opacity of the deal's financing structure, and concerns
that the deal would harm consumers for the benefit of shareholders.248 A few
months later, Oregon's Public Utility Commission unanimously denied approval
for a proposed acquisition of Portland General Electric (PGE) in another highly
debt-financed deal led by TPG.249 Among other things, the Oregon regulator found
that the high amount of debt being used to finance this takeover would lead to
"lower credit ratings for PGE, undue pressure on PGE to make dividend payments
to [its shareholders], and the risk of bankruptcy .... 250




241 See Fitch Cuts TXU On Buyout, Moody's, S&P May Cut, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/txu-ratings-moodys-idUSL267257220070226.
244 Id.
241 See Moody's Downgrades Existing Ratings of TXU Corp. and Subsidiaries, MOODY'S INVESTORS
SERVICE, Oct. 9, 2007, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-existing
-ratings-of-TXU-Corp-and-subsidiaries--PR 142000; S&P. TXU Downgraded to BB' on Acquisition
Capital Plan; Still on Watch Neg, BONDSONLINE, Mar. 2, 2007,
http://www.bondsonline.com/News Releases/TXU Downgraded To BB Credit Watch Negative 2
.php.
246 Rachel Beck, Buyout Boom a Bust for Bondholders, ALASKA JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, May
2007, http://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2007-05-20/buyout-boom-bust
-bondholders#.VvMr8TG2W24.
247 See Reorganization of Unisource Energy Corp. No. E-04230A-03-0933 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n
Nov. 8, 2004) (order denying application for approval of merger agreement), available at
http://www.azcc.gov/divisions/utilities/electric/uns-0933.pdf.
241 See Press Release, Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, Commission Rejects Unisource Acquisition (Dec. 23,
2004), http://www.azcc.gov/divisions/utilities/news/prl2-23-04.htm.
249 See News Release, Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Commission Rejects PGE Sale (Mar. 10, 2005),
http:llwww.puc.state.or.us/Pages/news/2005/2005 07.aspx.
211 Order No. 05-114 at 21, Or. Elec. Util. Co. Application for Authorization to Acquire Portland
Gen. Elec. Co., No. UM 1121 (Or. P.U.C. Mar. 10, 2005) (order denying application), available at
http://apps.puc.state.or.us/orders/2005ords/05-114.pdf.
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As a result of these previous legislative defeats in other states, the parties
involved in the TXU acquisition were sensitive to how regulators might react to the
deal.251 In an apparent attempt o assuage concerns from Texas's Public Utility
Commission (PUC), KKR announced that, upon the approval of the acquisition, the
newly acquired TXU would commit to a 10% decrease in electricity prices through
September 2008 and reduce the number of coal plants it was planning to open from
eleven to three.252
KKR and TPG's fears of political action derailing their acquisition were
renewed several weeks later when the Texas PUC issued its formal findings that
TXU had manipulated electricity prices in 2005 and recommended $210 million in
253fines against the company. As one media outlet observed, this "unexpectedly
tough recommendation is a sign of rising regulatory interest in the proposed . ..
takeover of TXU by [KKR] and TPG .. 254 This heightened interest in the TXU
deal was not confined to state lawmakers. Representative Joe Barton, then the
ranking Republican on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, made
comments that were critical of the proposed acquisition of TXU, and pondered
publicly whether Texas electricity generation and delivery should be subject to
federal oversight in the wake of this deal.
255
256
TXU was already engaged in political activity prior to its acquisition, but it
ramped up these efforts significantly in order to ensure that the merger went
through.25' As the watchdog group Texans for Public Justice has documented, TXU
151 See Ken MacFadyen, An Uphill Battle to Bag the Biggest LBO Ever: Political Uncertainty and
Competing Bidders Stand in the Way of KKR and TPG Clinching Their Record-Breaking LBO,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.themiddlemarket.com/maj/20070401/32132
-1 .html.
15' TXU to Set New Direction as Private Company: Public Benefits Include Price Cuts, Price
Protection, Investments in Alternative Energy and Stronger Environmental Policies, KKR MEDIA CTR.,
Feb. 26, 2007, http://media.kkr.com/media/media releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID 333037.
153 See Utility TXU Slapped With $210 Million Fine, NBC NEWS, Mar. 29, 2007,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17851991/ns/business-oil and energy/t/utility-txu-slapped-million
-fine/#.VwqQF3C5Awc.
154 Alex Barker, Lone Star Up 360o on Deal News, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/intllcms/s/0/5f3f3b2c-de5c-1 db-afa7-000b5df10621.html#axzz45L 1OXW5y.
155 See Chris Baltimore, Texas Lawmaker Scrutinizes Proposed TXU Buyout, REUTERS, Mar. 12,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/txu-buyout-congress-idUSN1236910620070312. KKR and TPG
engaged in a significant amount of political action at the federal level to coopt potential federal
jurisdiction over state energy markets. For example, immediately after Rep. Barton's comments were
released, KKR and TPG hired "almost a dozen" lobbyists and retained the services of Covington &
Burling LLP to help influence Congress. See Kevin Bogardus, Lobbyists Hired to Represent Investor
Groups in $45B Buyout, THE HILL, Mar. 27, 2007, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/3032
-lobbyists-hired-to-represent-investor-groups-in-45b-buyout.
116 For example, just prior to the announcement of its acquisition by KKR and TPG, TXU spent
millions of dollars in lobbying and advertising in an effort to get approval from Texas regulators to open
up eleven new coal plants. See R.G. Ratcliffe & Mark Babineck, TXU Fights for 11 New Coal Plants at
$10 Billion Tab, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 11, 2007, http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/TXU
-fights-for-i 1-new-coal-plants-at-10-billion-1546554.php. This included the purchase of 2400 breakfast
tacos that awaited Texas legislators and their staff on the opening day of the new legislative session,
accompanied by the note, "Compliments of your friends at TXU." Id. TXU's lobbying team during this
period consisted of 27 executives, and also relied on 14 outside lobbyists. Id.
"' KKR and TPG also became heavily involved in political activity to try to assure regulatory
approval of their proposed LBO. I do not describe the activities of KKR and TPG since it does not raise
the same problem of non-shareholder agency costs that TXU expenditures do.
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spent at least $15 million in lobbying and related efforts in early 2007 to try to
ensure that the proposed LBO would not be held up by state regulators.258 The
target of its efforts was a bill before the Texas state legislature that would give the
Texas PUC the power to review the TXU buyout and potentially force TXU's
buyers to sell off the energy generation and transmission companies owned by the
TXU holding company (TXU was the retail electricity provider).259 To stymie the
bill, TXU employed a group of 65 registered lobbyists, which included a number of
lobbyists who were close to Texas Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst26° and
Speaker of the House Tom Craddick.26 1 These included Dewhurst's former
business advisor and close friend Dennis Thomas, who was hired as a contract
lobbyist, and Dewhurst's former chief of staff Bruce Gibson, who was hired in
262early 2007 as a policy advisor. TXU also retained the services of former Dallas
263Mayor Ron Kirk and the son of Speaker Craddick's next-door neighbor.
The deal ultimately turned into a disaster, both for the newly added investors
(shareholders and creditors) and for existing creditors. At the time the LBO was
proposed, Texas electricity prices were quite high, averaging $56.35 per megawatt
264hour in 2007 and surging to $77.19 in 2008. Texas electricity prices were closely
tied to the price of natural gas, which were historically quite high at the time of the
acquisition. Due in large part to technological innovations in hydraulic fracturing,
or fracking, and a surge in new drilling and exploration efforts in the United States,
natural gas prices plummeted from a high of $13 per million British thermal units
265to a low of $2.32 in 2012. EFH, the successor company to TXU, famously filed
266for bankruptcy in April 2014.
"' See Leveraging a Buyout: TXU's Takeover Lobby Cost About $17 Million, LOBBY WATCH,
Aug. 14, 2007, http://info.tpj.org/Lobby Watch/08-14-07 txuactivities07.html (documenting that TXU
spent about $3.8 million on outside lobbyists, another $11 million in political advertising, and another
$200,000 on gifts to state officials).
"' R.G. Ratcliffe, Big Guns Used to Kill Electric Utility Reform, HOUSTON CHRON., June 2,
2007, http://www.chron.com/news/article/Big-guns-used-to-kill-electric-utility-reform- 1800230.php.
.60 The Texas Lieutenant Governor is considered by many to be the most powerful elected official
in the state, particularly when it comes to influencing legislative action. See Dave McNeely, Who Runs
Texas?, TEX. OBSERVER, July 30, 2010, https://www.texasobserver.org/who-runs-texas ("[a] long
standing argument is that the lieutenant governor of Texas is more powerful than the governor"); Ben
Philpott, Why is the Lieutenant Governor the Most Powerful Office in Texas? And Who Wants That
Power?, KUT NEWS, Oct. 16, 2014, http://kut.org/post/why-lieutenant-governor-most-powerful-office
-texas-and-who-wants-power (describing the Lieutenant Governor as the office "that some people say is
the most powerful one in Texas").
161 The Speaker of the House in Texas is also considered more powerful than most state speakers.
This is because following Reconstruction, the drafters of the Texas state constitution intentionally
divided power between the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Speaker positions. See McNeely, supra
note 260.
161 See R.A. Dyer, Dewhurst's TXU Ties Are Criticized, STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 22, 2007.
163 See Ratcliffe, Big Guns Used to Kill Electric Utility Reform, supra note 259.
161 See Rebecca Smith, How Shale-Gas Boom Led to Demise of Energy Future Holdings, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 29, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052702304163604579531644232506988.
161 See Peter Lattman, A Record Buyout Turns Sour for Investors, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Feb.
28, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/a-record-buyout-tums-sour-for-investors.
166 See John Bringardner, Looking to Shed $40B in Debt, Energy Future Holdings (TXU) Files
Ch. 11, FORBES, Apr. 29, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2014/04/29/looking-to-shed
-40b-in-debt-energy-future-holdings-txu-files-ch- 1/#6ed48025e7e3.
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TXU spent a substantial amount of general treasury funds on CPA intended to
ensure that its proposed acquisition would go through, and these expenditures were
successful in reaching their desired outcome. Ex ante, this acquisition was very
much in the interests of shareholders and managers and very much against the
interests of outstanding creditors, who suffered significant losses on their
investment, both in the near term and in the long term, due to the LBO.
B. Non-Shareholder Agency Costs of CPA Are Substantial
These examples illustrate some of the more spectacular instances of the agency
costs posed by CPA for non-shareholders, but do not represent more than a narrow
slice of the potential agency conflicts that can arise, and are not meant to
encompass all of the different ways in which CPA might create agency costs for
non-shareholders. Other types of CPA, such as lobbying against pro-union or pro-
worker laws and regulations, would clearly run against employee interests. Creditor
interests might be harmed by CPA that pushes for certain types of changes in
bankruptcy law or the regulation of credit rating agencies, who play a critical role
in many debt offerings. It is almost impossible to imagine all of the different ways
in which corporate stakeholders might have conflicts over CPA, because to do so
requires us to think about all of the different ways in which the law might be
changed to benefit shareholders and harm other corporate stakeholders.
Unfortunately, in the absence of any empirical data, it is impossible to know how
large of a problem the non-shareholder agency costs of CPA might be.
Given that the types of agency conflicts here creditor-manager, creditor-
shareholder, employee-manager, mployee-shareholder can result in considerable
costs in the general corporate governance ontext, as Part I.B describes, it seems
likely that they are also quite substantial in the context of CPA. Moreover, the
sheer size of the economic investments that non-shareholders hold in the firm
makes it logical to assume that these potential agency problems are quite large in
pecuniary terms as well. Debt investors are a huge source of financing for
corporations, particularly the large, publicly traded corporations that are most
active in the political arena. Employees are also critical to the success of the firm.
While it is difficult to measure the quantitative value of their importance to the
firm, or the value of their human capital investments, they are clearly enormous.
The agency costs that these non-shareholders face may be larger than those faced
by shareholders, given that non-shareholders are even further removed from the
mechanisms of control than shareholders. Moreover, as the interests of insiders
become more aligned with those of shareholders, a larger potential conflict emerges
between the corporation and its non-shareholder constituents.
IV. "Procedures of Corporate Democracy" Do Not Address Non-Shareholder
Agency Costs of Corporate Political Activity
The high agency costs that CPA produces for non-shareholders raise an obvious
question: whether these agency costs are, or potentially can be, contained by the
existing corporate governance infrastructure, either through corporate law or
private ordering. There are really two analyses here that must be undertaken. First,
does corporate law control non-shareholder agency costs arising from CPA?
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Second, can private ordering solutions address these costs? This Part looks at the
first question and concludes that corporate law is unlikely to ameliorate the agency
cost problem that CPA raises for non-shareholders. It then turns to the second
question and argues that private ordering is unlikely to be effective due to large
economic frictions.
A. Theoretical Arguments for Shareholder Primacy Are Unpersuasive for CPA
As Part II describes, corporate law and corporate governance are generally
understood to embody, if imperfectly, the principles of shareholder primacy, and
this ordering is thought to be the normatively correct outcome. This claim centers
on the assertion that shareholder primacy is the arrangement that corporate
stakeholders would themselves agree to in most circumstances, in the absence of
transaction costs. Because there are high transaction costs, corporate law should
reflect the terms of this hypothetical bargain, so as to maximize the efficiency of
corporate capital formation. This insight provides a powerful normative
justification for shareholder primacy in corporate law.
This argument rests critically on two claims. First, as residual claimants,
shareholders have the best incentives to maximize the expected utility for all
stakeholders, since they receive only what is left after all of the fixed claimants are
paid. Second, non-shareholders, as fixed claimants, are better situated to contract
for covenants that advance their interests or to seek the protections offered by
external laws. In other words, non-shareholders are protected by law and their
capacity to contract, and shareholders are best positioned to steer the corporation to
act in ways that benefit all stakeholders.
But while this argument may be persuasive for corporate governance generally,
does it also hold as a justification for shareholder primacy in the firm's decision to
engage in CPA? Somewhat surprisingly, this is a question that has not yet been
addressed in the post-Citizens United literature. 267 Virtually all of the corporate
law-based analysis of corporate political speech since that decision has assumed
shareholder primacy as a starting point and focused on agency issues between
shareholders and managers.26 8 No one has yet looked closely at the underlying
question of whether shareholder primacy is the appropriate norm for CPA. Indeed,
as I demonstrate in this Part, the main theoretical arguments for shareholder
267. David Yosifon thoughtfully explores some of the issues that corporate political
speech raises for the nexus-of-contracts approach in the aftermath of Citizens United, but does not
address the threshold question of whether shareholder primacy should govern corporate political
activity. See generally David G. Yosifon, Discourse Norms as Default Rules. Structuring Corporate
Speech to Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 189 (2011) [hereinafter Yosifon,
Discourse Norms]; David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law. Corporate Social
Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N. CAR. L. REV. 1197 (2011). Instead, Yosifon focuses on the
types of communications made by corporations and concludes that we ought to look to what the
"discourse norms" are for these types of communications to determine what the default rules should be.
For example, Yosifon argues that the "practical and moral expectations" that are present in commercial
advertising, including boundaries on the level of "puffery" and misleading advertising, should guide our
understanding of the default rules around corporate communications in this space. Yosifon, Discourse
Norms, supra, at 195-203.
268. A partial but representative list of this scholarship can be found supra at note 1.
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primacy in corporate governance generally are inapt when it comes to corporate
political activity.
1. CPA Creates a Private Rent-Seeking Problem that Diminishes the
Residual Claimant Incentives Argument
As discussed in Part II.C, one key justification for shareholder primacy is the
idea that shareholders, as residual claimants, have the best incentives to guide the
corporation in the interests of all stakeholders. This argument may have some
persuasive appeal for general business activities, the benefits of which appear in the
form of revenues that flow into the general treasury and are distributed according to
each stakeholder's relative priority of claims. When it comes to CPA, however, the
residual claimant argument falls apart. Certainly, many types of CPA can be
understood to benefit all corporate stakeholders, and thus can be properly described
as Pareto-efficient. For example, CPA that results in the elimination of redundant
or unnecessary regulation that negatively impacts the firm's business would be
positive for the business as a whole, and thus in the interests of all stakeholders.
This type of Pareto-efficient CPA is not different in kind than any other investment
by the firm, insofar as the benefits that accrue from it are directed to the general
corporate treasury, and istributed to all corporate stakeholders according to their
priority.
But as the analysis in Part III illustrates, many forms of CPA are intended to
result in legal or regulatory changes that primarily or solely benefit a subset of
corporate stakeholders. These types of CPA can be thought of as rent seeking
activities, insofar as they seek to benefit some stakeholders at the direct expense of
other stakeholders.2 69  Of course, most CPA likely falls somewhere in between
Pareto-efficient and rent-seeking, providing some benefits to the corporation as a
whole but primarily or wholly directing these benefits to certain classes of
stakeholders. But to the extent that some CPA is driven at least in part by rent
seeking motivations, this undermines the normative argument for shareholder
primacy.
For example, political action that makes it difficult for employees to bargain
collectively benefits shareholders but harms employees. Political action that
increases the firm's risk of insolvency benefits shareholders but harms creditors.
Political action that reduces dividend taxes benefits shareholders but not other
stakeholders (at least not directly). And of course, as described in Part III, political
action that allows a firm to increase its risk of insolvency may be beneficial to
269. While the term "rent-seeking" is often associated with political lobbying and
other efforts meant to influence politicians to provide some form of monopoly rents, the term is also
used to describe non-productive competition for surplus value within the firm. See discussion supra note
64; see also MARK ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 128 (2003) (stating
that "[c]ompetition for rents ... is not just between firms but also inside firms as the players inside the
firm-shareholders, managers, employees, compete to grab a piece of [surplus profits]"); Blair & Stout,
supra note 4, at 249 (describing rent seeking as competition between different corporate stakeholders to
capture the surplus generated by the firm). Bainbridge argues that a greater emphasis on shareholder
primacy has led to greater rent-seeking between shareholders. BAINBRIDGE, NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 138, at 228-32 (citing Lynn Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder
Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 794-95 (2007) (describing the problem of intershareholder rent-seeking)).
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shareholders while harming the interests of creditors and employees. The risk of
private rent-seeking raised by CPA upends the logic that shareholders, as residual
claimants, have the appropriate incentives to ensure that all of the fixed claimants,
who are senior in payment priority, get paid first. Thus, this crucial contractarian
argument for shareholder primacy may be unpersuasive for CPA.
2. CPA Can Circumvent Contractual Covenants and External Laws
CPA also undermines the other core justification given by contractarians for
shareholder primacy, namely, that non-shareholder interests are better situated to be
protected by contract and by external laws. If external laws are seen as a valid
means to limit the agency costs of non-shareholders, then these are necessarily
exogenous to shareholder primacy itself. That is to say, the claim that shareholders
should be prioritized because the availability of external laws mitigates non-
shareholder conflicts with shareholders only makes sense if the firm itself cannot
modify those external laws. If corporations, acting on behalf of shareholders, can
change or eliminate the laws that protect non-shareholder constituents, then it is
incoherent to claim that non-shareholder interests are protected by these laws. Since
CPA has the potential to change the external laws upon which non-shareholders
rely, it naturally follows that shareholder primacy should not govern for CPA.
Another argument for shareholder primacy in corporate governance is that non-
shareholders can gain protection through "negative covenants" that limit the
behavior of the corporation in ways that can minimize non-shareholder agency
costs. This assertion also relies on an unstated but crucial assumption of
exogeneity, namely, that the contractual rights negotiated by each set of parties at
the time of contracting are static and impervious to the firm's own activities. But
that is not necessarily the case with CPA, which can change the background legal
rights and ordering that were baseline assumptions at the time of contracting. For
example, when a creditor negotiates a particular level of seniority in her claims, she
negotiates her priority against a background of legal expectations that are thought
to be immutable. But as Roe and Tung have pointed out, political activity can even
change creditor priorities in bankruptcy. 27  Thus, just about any contractual
provision that one could imagine writing to protect non-shareholder interests could
potentially be co-opted by CPA. A contractual provision setting the minimum wage
for a company's employees at $10 an hour could be effectively eliminated by
political action that creates greater inflation or allows the firm to eliminate
employee benefits. A covenant requiring that a company maintain a certain
leverage ratio could be effectively bypassed by the SEC's adoption of new
accounting rules that allow the company to reclassify how it accounts for certain
liabilities (such as with potential changes to mark-to-market accounting). Thus, the
claim that non-shareholder interests are well protected through contract seems
inapt, or at least less apt, when it comes to CPA.
270. Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-
Seeking Upends the Creditors 'Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1238-41 (2013) (describing how creditors
have "jumped priority" through lobbying and other political activities targeted at Congress and federal
administrative agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission).
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Moreover, if we revisit the hypothetical bargain scenario at the heart of the
nexus-of-contracts approach, it is also difficult to imagine why and under what
circumstances non-shareholders would concede to shareholders the unlimited use
of corporate funds to try to change the laws and regulations that are in place at the
time the bargain is struck, without any consultation or approval from non-
shareholders. Shareholders and non-shareholders alike place great monetary value
on legal certainty,2 7 1 and corporate contractarians have noted in advocating for
shareholder primacy that external laws provide great value to non-shareholders in
protecting their interests. It therefore seems unlikely that non-shareholders would
submit to a bargain in which shareholders could utilize general corporate treasury
funds-to which all of the corporation's stakeholders contribute and claim
entitlement-to advance their own political and economic interests, given the sharp
potential divergence between shareholders and non-shareholders in this regard, and
the possibility of rent-seeking described above.
For general business activities, the shareholder primacy norm does not seem to
have the potential to impact the legal framework in place. Thus, the contractarian
claim that non-shareholders would concede shareholder primacy may be
persuasive. However, CPA is quite different, in that it is often pursued precisely for
the purpose of influencing the basic legal background against which the
corporation and any hypothetical contractual arrangements that might justify
shareholder primacy was formed. It therefore seems untenable to claim, as the
contractarian argument for shareholder primacy does, that the shareholder primacy
norm reflects the default rules of corporate private ordering when it comes to the
firm's decision to engage in CPA.
3. Corporate Law Does Not Effectively Resolve Non-Shareholder Agency
Costs of CPA
When it comes to general corporate business decisions, there are very good
arguments for elevating the interests of shareholders above the interests of other
stakeholders. But in the context of CPA, as the above analysis indicates, the usual
mechanisms for reducing non-shareholder agency costs may be unavailable.
Furthermore, non-shareholders do not have recourse to the various "procedures of
corporate democracy" that are available to shareholders.
Thus, because of the strong conflicts between shareholders and other corporate
constituencies, it seems likely that shareholder primacy would actually worsen
rather than alleviate the problem of non-shareholder agency costs arising from
CPA. To the extent that corporate law is broadly understood today to prioritize the
271. See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decision
Making-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1985) (discussing the importance of
certainty in the valuation of corporate securities); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an
Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1987) (noting that legal
certainty is a primary reason why so many corporations choose to charter in Delaware); see also
Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From US. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in
International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525, 623-24 (2005) (stating investors would "likely
apply a heavy discount to the securities of issuers" in the absence of legal certainty).
272. See supra Part I.C.2.
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interests of shareholders over other corporate stakeholders, it does not appear to be
a likely avenue to solving the non-shareholder agency cost problem.
B. Private Ordering Does Not Address Non-Shareholder Agency Costs of CPA
While corporate law may not suffice to protect non-shareholder interests in
CPA, what about private ordering and market responses? In general, corporate law
scholars tend to assume that creditors and employees are best protected by private
law solutions, particularly contractual covenants. If, as the analysis in Part III
suggests, CPA poses significant potential problems for the interests of non-
shareholders, the natural place to look for solutions would be in private law.
Private law solutions to the agency cost problems raised by CPA have not been
greatly explored or discussed. To the extent that corporate stakeholders may
have strong interests in limiting CPA, as described in Part II above, there appears to
be some potential for private ordering to provide a regulatory solution to the agency
costs created by CPA. Could corporate stakeholders negotiate for contractual
covenants restricting or regulating CPA as a means of limiting the agency costs that
may arise from CPA? As I describe below, covenants have become increasingly
studied as a means of addressing creditor agency costs. Contractual solutions to the
agency problems raised by CPA could also potentially address employee agency
costs.
This Section analyzes how private ordering might work to limit non-shareholder
agency costs arising from CPA. Ultimately, I conclude that the hurdles to
implementing these types of covenants are so high that they are likely to be quite
narrowly limited in their potential application.
1. The Use of Covenants to Address Creditor Agency Costs
Covenants, especially those relating to real property, are as old as contracts law
itself. 4 They have been a staple of bank loans for quite a long time and have
273. One exception to this is Ganesh Sitaraman's proposal for a quasi-contractual
pledge between the two candidates in a particular political race, in which each candidate would promise
to donate some set amount of money to charity for each dollar of outside independent expenditures that
is spent in support of their campaign. Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 755, 776-799 (2014). This pledge would not be legally enforceable, but would rely
instead on normative sway, and thus its effectiveness ultimately depends on the legitimacy that it derives
from the consensus of the political candidates themselves. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 319, 327-29 (2002) (describing how rules adopted by private actors without government
sanction derive their legitimacy entirely from consensus agreement on the rules themselves). This could
be a tricky proposition, as these types of norms typically arise under conditions in which the parties
involved have repeat contact with one another, which is not generally the case with political candidates.
See Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1095, 1097-98 (1986);
Jack Hirschleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies,
4 REs. L. & ECON. 1, 33-38 (1982); Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697, 1715-16 (1996). Because this proposal targets the spending of politicians and is not
addressed at the agency costs of corporate stakeholders, I do not address it in this Article.
274. For example, restrictive covenants on the transfer of real property go back to the
early days of English common law. See R. Geoffrey Rowley, The Benefit of Restrictive Covenants: A
Survey, 16 MOD. L. REV. 428 (1953).
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increasingly become a staple of bond indenture agreements,27 5 although bond
investors rely on them far less.27 6 They have been ubiquitous in corporate debt
agreements, with one recent study finding that almost 97% of all corporate loans
contained at least one financial covenant.2 77 Covenants typically take the form of
affirmative covenants, negative covenants, and financial covenants. Affirmative
covenants require the borrower to take certain actions, such as meeting generally
accepted accounting principles, complying with regulatory and legal requirements,
and producing periodic disclosure reports.27 9 Affirmative covenants tend to be
limited in scope, because if they are seen as giving creditors too much control over
the firm, the corporation may lose its limited liability.2 ° Negative covenants, as
their name suggests, prohibit the borrower from taking certain actions, such as
changing control of the company or making excessive capital expenditures.
28 '
Finally, financial covenants restrict the borrower from exceeding certain
accounting-based ratios and limits, such as leverage ratios, interest coverage, or net
worth.
282
One very common type of corporate debt covenant is the dividend covenant,
which restricts the payments of dividends based on certain net income
283thresholds. Other commonly used covenants include: restrictions on debt
(typically in the form of leverage ratios),284 restrictions on liens, restrictions on the
sale or transfer of assets, restrictions on changes in control, and reporting
requirements.285 For covenants to be effective, creditors must be diligent and
effective monitors and detect when covenants have been violated.286 One common
approach to facilitate better monitoring is to require periodic disclosures of certain
types of information and/or to show compliance with covenants on a periodic
basis.
287
The traditional view of covenants is that they tend to avoid "extensive direction
restrictions on production/investment policy" because of the high transaction costs
275. See generally Judy Day & Peter Taylor, The Role of Debt Contracts and Debt
Covenants in Corporate Governance: Reflections on Evolution and Innovation, in ACCOUNTING AND
REGULATION 161, 161-90 (Roberto Di Petra et al., eds., 2014).
276. See Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 68-69 (Claire A. Hill and Brett H. McDonnell
eds., 2012).
277. Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An
Empirical Investigation, 4 J. FIN. 1657, 1662 (2009).
278. See Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713, 1719-20 (2012) [hereinafter Nini et al., Creditor ControlRights].
279. Id.
280. See Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants in Commercial Loan
Documentation: Uses andLimitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335, 352-55 (1991).
281. See Nini et al. Creditor Control Rights, supra note 278, at 1719-20.
282. Id.
283. See, e.g., Avner Kalay, Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend
Constraints, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 211, 217 (1982) (finding that 85% of corporate debt reported by Moody's
Industrial Manual from 1956-1975 contained a dividend restriction).
284. See Bratton, Bond Covenants, supra note 110, at 10-11.
285. Id. at 11-15.
286. See, e.g., Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as
Incentives to Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995).




involved with such restrictions. The evidence today, however, is that creditors do
indeed negotiate for covenants that are extremely specific as to the types of
expenditures that are made.2 89 As a recent but very influential line of literature has
articulated, covenants are already a very powerful, if occasionally underutilized,
mechanism by which debt investors can control the behavior of corporate290
managers. Baird and Rasmussen go so far as to call contractual covenants the
"missing lever" of corporate governance.29 1 Whether or not this is an accurate
depiction, it is important to recognize that creditors already rely heavily on
covenants to address agency costs. Breaches of contractual covenants not only
provide the potential of legal remedies, but the threat of default that accompanies
such breaches, which is also frequently used to negotiate changes in corporate
behavior that are advantageous to creditor interests.2 92 In other words, the violation
of covenants gives creditors significant leverage in forcing beneficial changes in
corporate governance. Thus, debt investors have increasingly negotiated for
covenants that firms are likely to violate,2 93 with the expectation that these
contractual "trip-wires" will allow them to negotiate additional changes as
desired.294 Conversely, firms with better governance require fewer covenants.
295
2. High Barriers to Covenants Restricting Corporate Political Activity
As Smith and Warner argued in their seminal paper on creditor covenants, most
existing covenants can be understood as mechanisms to try to control creditor-
shareholder agency costs.2 96 Of course, until recently, much of the shareholder-
creditor conflict around CPA was addressed by state and federal campaign finance
laws, so there was no need for CPA-related covenants. As a result, there are
currently no covenants that deal with corporate political activity, as far as I am
aware. There are good reasons for this, some of which I discuss below. But the fact
that PAR covenants have not yet been negotiated oes not mean that they are not
feasible or enforceable. As Bratton has astutely observed, "Nothing in a protective
statutory regime prevents a financial creditor from negotiating for stricter
288. Smith & Warner, supra note 107, at 117.
289. See generally Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights, supra note 278.
290. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006); George G. Triantis & Ronald J.
Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995).
291. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 290.
292. See Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights, supra note 278.
293. See id. at 2-3 (finding that 10-20% of creditors report a covenant violation in any
given year).
294. See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 277, 1660 (showing that only about four percent
of covenant violations actually result in the creditor demanding its contractual recourse of full principal
repayment within two quarters after the violation, thus illustrating that most lenders utilize covenant
violations to negotiate desired changes to corporate behavior).
295. Xi Li et al., Corporate Governance and Covenants in Debt Contracts (Apr. 30,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1988272 (finding
that corporate bond investors demand fewer covenants for contracts with corporations that have stronger
corporate governance structures).
296. Smith & Warner, supra note 107.
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protection." 297 Indeed, the basic mechanisms by which PAR covenants would seek
to restrict corporate political activity are conceptually very similar to the extensive
activity restrictions that already are utilized in credit agreements.2 98 Similarly, PAR
covenants requiring disclosure of CPA are consistent with the reporting
requirements already used in covenants.
299
Unfortunately, while PAR covenants may be practicable in the context of
contractual covenants, they face large economic frictions that make them extremely
difficult to implement in practice. This includes the high "stickiness" of covenants,
which do not typically adapt very efficiently to changing conditions, and the high
transaction costs involved in writing, monitoring, and enforcing such covenants.
a. Sticky Covenants
As a growing body of literature has described, covenants tend to suffer from
great "stickiness" in other words, they tend to remain relatively constant over
time resulting in a high and often suboptimal use of standardized terms. This is
true to some degree of all contractual terms used in complex commercial
transactions, in which lawyers heavily rely upon existing boilerplate to draft
contracts.30 0 Corporate contracts generally have more stickiness than other types of
contracts.30 1 Public debt contracts are among the stickiest types of contracts, with
boilerplate terms tending to persist across all offerings, even when they are
suboptimal.302 Syndicated loans and private placements also have relatively sticky
covenants.30 3 Additionally, covenants tend to be cyclical, with debt contracts
exhibiting more covenants during periods of tighter credit, and fewer covenants
during periods of loose credit.304 Covenants' high degree of stickiness and
cyclicality mean that new covenants, even those that are optimal for creditor
interests, tend to be introduced in uneven, inefficient ways, and sometimes not at
all.
297. Bratton, Bond Covenants, supra note 110, at 4.
298. See generally Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights, supra note 278.
299. Id.
300. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT F. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2012).
301. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 774-815 (1995) (demonstrating that various network externalities and
learning effects cause inertia in the adoption of contract terms).
302. See id. at 816-19; see also Gus DeFranco et al., Sticky Covenants (Chicago
Booth Initiative on Global Markets, Working Paper No. 94, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 2288723 (providing a literature review of the
evidence that public bond covenants are highly rigid).
303. See, e.g., Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts, How Does Financing Impact
Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants, 63 J. FIN. 2085 (2008); Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M.
James, The Information Content of Bank Loan Covenants, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 3700 (2010); Ilia D.
Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis, 40 J. ACCT.
RES. 1091 (2002); Stephen Drucker & Manju Puri, On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting and Lending
Relationships, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2835 (2009); Justin Murfin, The Supply-Side Determinants of Loan
Contract Strictness, 67 J. FIN. 1565 (2012).
304. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 151, at 53-56.
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b. High Transaction Costs
There are multiple types and classes of creditors, with a partial list including
senior secured creditors, bond investors, subordinated debt investors, trade
creditors, tort victims, and the Internal Revenue Service.30 5 As previously noted,
these different classes of corporate debt are usually divided into two broad
categories: public debt, which consists of publicly offered bonds, and private debt,
which consists of bank loans and privately placed bond issues.306 Most corporate
debt is private debt. For example, in 2003, $1.1 trillion of the $1.6 trillion in
corporate debt issued that year was private debt.30 7 Both public and private debt
investors utilize covenants. Bank loans employ term loan agreements; private
placements rely on note purchase agreements; and public bonds use debenture
indentures to lay out the terms of the agreement between the firm and its
creditors.30 All of these types of contracts tend to rely on standardized terms,
which have developed slowly over time.309 Public and private debt have many
distinct characteristics, so it is worth briefly describing the differences between the
two.
Typically, the public debt market is associated with large, publicly traded
companies with lower degrees of leverage, broadly available public information
(including through SEC filings), and higher credit quality. These are, of course, the
types of for-profit companies that are most active in CPA. 3 1 Moreover, investors in
publicly offered corporate bonds tend to be seeking safer, higher-quality
investments, so they have sharp conflicts with shareholders as far as their
tolerances for firm risk. Thus, public bond investors seem like ideal candidates to
want to implement covenants restricting corporate political activity, since they have
a low threshold for risk and face high agency costs from CPA.
305. Rock, supra note 98, at 1929.
306. There are many different types of corporate bonds, and some of these are more
closely held, and thus more closely resemble private loans than publicly issued bonds with large
numbers of investors. See Kwan & Carleton, supra note 106, at 910; Smith & Warner, supra note 107,
at 149-50 (noting that relying on trustee monitoring entails agency costs of its own, as "[t]he trustee will
... not act entirely in the bondholders' interest. This is particularly true because the extent to which the
trustee can be held negligent is limited ... ").
307. See Arena, supra note 106, at 392. However, as Whitehead points out, the
division between "public" and "private" debt is increasingly becoming outdated. Advances in the capital
markets have meant that most "private" bonds and many "private" loans are increasingly being funded
via a wide array of investors, and the actual credit risk is widely dispersed through the use of derivatives
and other capital market innovations. Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt. Covenants, the
Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 661-68 (2009).
308. Bratton, Bond Covenants, supra note 110, at 41.
309. Id.
310. It is difficult to ascertain who exactly is responsible for CPA, given the opacity
of these types of expenditures. That being said, the available evidence suggests that large, publicly held
corporations are responsible for the vast majority of such activity. For example, Strategas Research
Partners developed a "K-Street Index" of the fifty corporations that most intensively lobbied the federal
government. This list was made up entirely of large, publicly traded corporations, and included such
blue chip corporations as Altria, Amgen, Boeing, Darden Restaurants, Eli Lilly, FedEx, H&R Block,
Lockheed Martin, MasterCard, McGraw-Hill, Monsanto, Northrop Grumman, Qualcomm, Raytheon,
Tyson Foods, and United Parcel Service. See Nicholas Bohnsack, Investment & Sector Strategy,
STRATEGAS RESEARCH GRP. (May 2010),
http://www.portolagroup.com/media/PGI Q2 2010 CC Slides.pdf.
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Unfortunately, public bonds also have very high transaction costs, due to the
wide dispersion of these instruments.311 Corporate bonds face costly loan
monitoring problems, which results either in duplication of effort or a free rider
problem.3 12 This, in turn, creates severe collective action and coordination
problems. And while information about the firm's credit characteristics is often
widely available through SEC filings and other public disclosures, this is not the
case with respect to corporate political activity, which is still quite opaque and
undisclosed. As John Coates has described:
All empirical studies of CPA are challenged by the fact that only certain kinds of
CPA are required to be disclosed, even by public companies. If Exxon hires a registered
lobbyist or lobbying firm to act as such, the lobbyist and/or firm must disclose that fact, but
nothing requires Exxon to disclose the fact that it may hire a law or public relations firm (not
registered as a lobbyist) that engages in activities that are essentially political in nature, and
would be identified as "lobbying" in ordinary speech. Books, television ads or appearances,
op-eds, pamphlets, congressional testimony, efforts to stimulate "grass-roots" letter-writing
campaigns, public comments on proposed regulations, and all lobbying activities by those
whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in services are all
arguably exempt from the legal definition of "lobbying contacts," depending on the facts.
Lobbying disclosure laws are also largely unenforced. ... Even contributions and election
expenditures are exempt from disclosure if carefully funneled through "conduits," that is,
"independent" organizations."1
The lack of information about CPA is particularly problematic for public bonds,
because the widely dispersed investors in this type of debt face high monitoring
costs and a free rider problem. In short, high transactions costs block public bond
investors from seeking political activity restriction covenants that they would
otherwise be inclined to obtain.
Perhaps because of these higher transaction costs, bond investor governance is
generally seen as less effective than bank lender governance. It can still sometimes
be effective in monitoring and managing agency costs, though, especially if
information and coordination issues are mitigated.3 14 The increasing sophistication
of bond investors, including the emergence of hedge funds, vulture funds, and asset
management firms, may have improved the conditions for bondholder governance
by reducing collective action and free rider problems.
31 5
In short, investors in public debt likely have the incentives to negotiate for PAR
covenants, but high transaction costs, coupled with the stickiness of bond covenants
311. See Denis & Mihov, supra note 106 (reviewing the literature on public debt and
finding that public debt tends to be issued by the largest, high-credit-quality corporations, likely due to
the high transaction costs facing these investors).
312. See generally Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated
Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393, 393-94 (1994) (stating that the problem of costly monitoring of
loan contracts creates either a duplication of effort or a free-rider problem among bondholders). In
practice, the covenants of publicly offered bonds are enforced by the bond's trustee, who is appointed
and paid by the borrowing firm and thus is not a particularly strong monitor or enforcer of investor
interests.
313. Coates, supra note 1, at 661.
314. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk
Bond Covenant Changes?, 66 J. Bus. 499, 500-01 (1993).
315. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of
Bondholder Rights, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 281, 284-92 (2009).
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described above, mean that there are some serious hurdles to amending bond
indentures to include these types of covenants.
On the other hand, private debt investors tend to face smaller transaction costs
and therefore use covenants more frequently and effectively. Investors in private
debt tend to be commercial banks and life insurance companies that specialize in
evaluating credit risk, and thus tend to be better suited to bridge the information
asymmetries that exist in debt investments.3 16  Smaller and/or distressed
corporations, who have fewer available options and therefore less bargaining
power, tend to rely more heavily on private debt, which is typically costlier and is
accompanied by more and more intrusive covenants.3 17 Thus, private debt investors
wield disproportionate control in the governance of smaller and/or distressed
companies,3 18 As a result, private debt investors investing in smaller companies are
better situated both to secure access to greater information about the firm's
activities,319 and to more successfully assert demands on the corporation issuing
320
debt. So while public bond investors face high barriers to monitoring and
enforcing covenant terms, and thus utilize them less frequently, private debt
investors have relatively low transaction costs and utilize covenants aggressively,
including as "tripwires" to provide them with more leverage to negotiate key
changes.
321
But while private debt investors might be better situated to negotiate for and
enforce covenants restricting corporate political activity, they may be less inclined
to do so. Corporations that are smaller and possibly near insolvency are the ones
that rely most heavily on private debt and agree to the types of covenants that give
creditors greater control.3 22 These are not generally the types of companies that are
engaging in high levels of CPA.
3. Pricing and Exit Are Also Problematic Solutions for Non-Shareholder
Agency Costs
While covenants may be unlikely to address non-shareholder agency costs
arising from CPA, another way in which debt investors might exert some measure
of governance on agency problems is through traditional market mechanisms
demanding increased yields for the greater risk involved with CPA, or by selling
their debt. Again, because the issue of non-shareholder agency costs of CPA has
316. See Sudha Krishnaswami et al., Information Asymmetry, Monitoring, and the
Placement Structure of Corporate Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 407, 408 (1999).
317. Id.; see also Denis & Mihov, supra note 106 (describing how credit quality of
the debt issuer is a key factor in the choice of debt financing used, with the highest quality firms tending
to choose more public debt, and lower quality firms choosing private debt).
318. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 290, at 1231-33.
319. See generally Eugene F. Fama, What's Different About Banks?, 15 J.
MONETARY ECON. 29, 37-38 (1985) (describing the comparative advantage of banks in securing
information about borrowers).
320. See Thomas J. Chemmanur & Paolo Fulghieri, Reputation, Renegotiation, and
the Choice Between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt, 7 REv. FIN. STUD. 475, 476-79 (1994);
Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J.
FIN. 1189, 1190-92 (1991).
321. See Chemmanur & Fulghieri, id. at 476-79.
322. See supra note 106 for authorities describing this point.
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not been a subject of study, there is no empirical research focused specifically on
whether and how non-shareholders react to CPA in terms of their pricing or
purchase decisions. But research on creditor discipline generally provides us with
some insights on this question.
As previously discussed, creditors are broadly divided into two categories
private debt investors and public debt investors. Private debt investors are better
constituted to bridge the informational asymmetries involved in corporate debt
investment. They also tend to provide a greater share of debt financing to
corporations that are smaller or more distressed. Thus, private debt investors are
well equipped to monitor and enforce business decisions that are adverse to their
interests. Conversely, investors in public debt tend to be more diffuse, with less
access to information, less capacity to monitor the firm's activities, and large
coordination, collective action, and free rider problems. Thus, in general, investors
in public debt have tended to be associated with larger corporations with high credit
quality generally, the type of debt issuer that creates the largest potential agency
problems arising from CPA.
As discussed above, most CPA (at least among for-profit corporations) comes
from large corporations, which rely more heavily on public debt. Given that public
debt investors generally are seen as poor monitors facing high informational
asymmetries, the idea that pricing or exit by debt investors in these companies can
meaningfully constrain the agency costs created by CPA seems dubious. The firms
that create the highest agency costs from their CPA are also the firms that have the
steepest information asymmetries and rely most heavily on debt investors who are
poorly equipped to monitor and discipline adverse corporate decisions.
3 23
V. Implications and Potential Solutions
The Court's decisions, beginning in the 1970s and continuing through Citizens
United, have effectively created a Kafkaesque situation for non-shareholders when
it comes to CPA. Non-shareholders face legitimate conflicts of interest with both
corporate insiders and the shareholders whose interests corporate law tells us
should be prioritized in the governance of the firm. And while the exact scope and
breadth of this problem still needs significant exploration, it is clear that the costs
of this conflict can be astronomical.
But even as it is clear that CPA presents significant agency costs for non-
shareholders, it appears that there are no viable solutions for this problem, either in
corporate law or in private ordering or market mechanisms. Ordinarily, we would
expect government regulation to address such a major market failure, where a
significant and costly problem exists and is not remedied by private market-based
solutions. But in the case of CPA, the Court's expansive view of corporate political
speech rights, without any serious analysis of the agency problems that are at the
heart of the decision to engage in CPA, has estopped state or federal governments
from providing such a regulatory solution.
In short, whatever we may think of the constitutional merits of Bellotti and
Citizens United, an examination of the agency problems that CPA creates for non-
323. See generally Min, supra note 173 (describing the failure of debt investors in
AAA-rated bank liabilities to react to rising risk).
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shareholders demonstrates that these decisions create very bad public policy. This
Part looks into the problems created by the Court's jurisprudence and explores
several options for trying to address them.
A. Restricting Corporate Political Activity
Having established in Part III that shareholder primacy, which clearly governs
general corporate business activities, should not be the norm for corporate political
activity, what then might be the default rules for CPA? To answer this question, it
is useful to revisit the hypothetical bargain approach described in Part I. What
terms might corporate stakeholders agree upon for governing CPA, in the absence
of transaction costs?
To get a sense of this, consider the dynamics that each set of stakeholders face.
CPA potentially creates very high agency problems, and unlike general business
decisions any particular decision to engage in CPA can lead to an intractable rent-
seeking problem, wherein one class or subclass of stakeholders is able to use firm
resources to change the underlying legal and contractual "rules of the game" in an
effort to benefit only itself, possibly while harming other stakeholder classes. Thus,
CPA can upend the external laws and contractual provisions that economists and
corporate law scholars tend to assume can mitigate non-shareholder agency
problems. Thus, the potential agency costs of CPA are quite large. And while many
types of CPA are Pareto-efficient, as described in Part II.B, there is simply no way
that non-shareholders can determine ex ante whether the firm will engage in CPA.
In other words, CPA raises evere post-contractual opportunism problems for non-
shareholders that cannot be sufficiently addressed through contract or other private
ordering mechanisms.
The solution to post-contractual opportunism, for shareholders, is to simply
prioritize their interests in corporate governance. However, this solution does not
work for all stakeholders, since we cannot prioritize the interests of all
stakeholders. Thus, corporate law, even assuming that it could be amended to
reflect a reordering of interests, does not appear to be an appropriate avenue for
addressing the problems that CPA raises for non-shareholder interests.
This analysis suggests that perhaps the most efficient rule is the one that was in
place for centuries prior to the Court's momentous decision in Bellotti a ban on
some or all forms of CPA, administered either through a reinvigorated ultra vires
doctrine or through campaign finance laws. Given the high agency costs imposed
on non-shareholders by CPA, the lack of viable private ordering solutions for
addressing this problem, and the problems that shareholder primacy, or the primacy
of any class of stakeholders, raises for the interests of other stakeholders, such a
ban would seem the most efficient way to address these agency cost problems, and
it would be easiest and cheapest to administer as well.
Moreover, to the extent that we are concerned about the capacity of corporate
stakeholders to continue to engage in positive-sum CPA, a vehicle for promoting
such activities, relying entirely on voluntary contributions from interested corporate
stakeholders, already exists the PAC (sometimes known as the separate
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segregated fund).324 Corporations are barred from directly donating general
treasury funds to political candidates under the Tillman Act of 1907.32 5 However,
this prohibition did not prevent corporations (or other organizations, including
labor unions) from persuading their stockholders and other interested parties to
establish separate, voluntarily funded political action committees.3 26 Corporate
PACs have played a critical role in the financing of political campaigns since at
least 1974, when amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act were enacted
that facilitated their creation.32 7  Corporate PACs may solicit voluntary
contributions from corporate shareholders, officers, and managers (and the families
of these individuals), and spend on political activities that are pronounced to be in
the corporation's interest.32 8 The importance of PACs was further heightened with
the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BRCA, popularly
known as "McCain-Feingold"), which, among other things, banned corporations
from using their general treasury funds to finance "electioneering
communications" television or radio advertisements that feature a candidate for
federal office, are capable of reaching 50,000 people, and are aired thirty days
before a primary or sixty days before a general election.
329
At least in theory, PACs should be able to marshal voluntary contributions from
those corporate insiders and shareholders interested in advancing their shared
political objectives, and they should be able to do so in a way that largely
eliminates the agency cost concerns that exist for CPA.330 But what of the costs of
setting up and operating PACs? The majority opinion in Citizens United was
deeply concerned with what it saw as the high costs of maintaining segregated
political funds. Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority:
324. See FED. ELECTION COMM'N, NONCONNECTED COMMITTEES 1 (2008),
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nongui.pdf.
325. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 35 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b). This prohibition was later applied to labor unions under the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, tit. III, 61 Stat. 159 (1947) (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 441b).
326. Ironically, these PACs were first utilized and popularized by labor unions. See
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 402-09 (1972) (discussing the history of
the CIO Political Action Committee and union-organized PACs, which first came to prominence with
the 1944 election).
327. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55). As Judge Skelly Wright describes, the
1974 Act contained several important legal changes that spurred the rapid growth of corporate PACs,
including a reversal of a longstanding ban on political activity by government contractors, important
clarifications on the limits of solicitation by corporate PACs, and limits on individual and party
contributions (which made PACs a relatively more important source of campaign finds). J. Skelly
Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics. Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 614 n.35 (1982).
328. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(C), invalidated inpart by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010) (current version at 52 U.S.C. §30118 (2012)).
329. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 203, 116
Stat. 91 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b, now transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012));
see also Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 588-
89(2011).
330. But see HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 66-67 (1995) (arguing that, because corporate PACs solicit funds primarily from
managers, these finds may reflect managerial interests more than shareholder interests).
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PACs are burdensome alternatives [to direct corporate political expenditures]; they are
expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must
appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the
identities of the persons making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an
organization statement and report changes to this information within 10 days .... PACs must
file detailed monthly reports with the FEC .... 331
And yet, despite what the Citizens United majority saw as overly burdensome
costs and regulation, PACs have undeniably been incredibly effective at raising and
spending money on political activities. In the 2008 election, the last before Citizens
United upended the regulatory framework restricting direct CPA, corporate PACs
dominated campaign finance, accounting for one out of every ten dollars received
by candidates running for federal office.332 In total, PACs raised $1.5 billion and
contributed $416 million during the 2008 election cycle.
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Certainly, the costs of PACs are a relevant factor in evaluating their overall
effectiveness. But such costs should not be considered in a vacuum, without
comparing them to the enormous and unsolvable agency costs that exist for CPA.
Indeed, most of the "burden" described by Justice Kennedy simply reflects the
costs of monitoring the PAC's political activities, costs that would otherwise be
part of the agency costs borne by corporate stakeholders. When compared with the
high potential agency costs of CPA, PACs seem like a reasonably efficient and
cost-effective vehicle for collecting and marshaling the funds of corporate
stakeholders to the political causes that benefit their interests.
In short, the high agency costs raised for all stakeholders by CPA, the severe
and apparently intractable problem of rent-seeking between stakeholders that CPA
creates, the lack of viable solutions for this problem in corporate law or private
ordering, and the availability of an effective alternative in PACs for promoting
voluntary, "positive-sum" CPA all lend support to the conclusion that CPA should
be outside the acceptable activities of the corporation.
B. Bellotti and Citizens United Create Bad Public Policy
The above analysis illustrates that, whatever their merits as constitutional
decisions, Bellotti and Citizens United create a severe public policy problem. As
the analysis in the previous section suggests, regulatory restrictions on CPA appear
to be justified by non-shareholder agency costs. Unfortunately, these regulatory
solutions are effectively estopped by the Court's expansive view of corporate
political speech protections under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as
articulated most notably in Bellotti and Citizens United.3 34 Whether or not these
decisions are compelling from a constitutional law perspective is outside the scope
331. 558 U.S. at 337-38.
332. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending and Shareholders' Rights:
Why the US. Should Adopt the British Approach, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 391, 396 (Abol Jalilvand & A.G. Malliaris eds., 2012).
333. Political Action Committees, CTR. FOR RES. POL'Y,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
334. For example, the Citizens United majority opinion stated that the government
"may not suppress corporate political speech altogether." 558 U.S. at 319.
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of this Article, but from a policy perspective, these decisions create frictions within
corporate ordering. By outlawing the implementation of regulatory restrictions, the
Court has ensured that the agency costs of CPA will remain high for non-
shareholders. This is not just a problem for these stakeholders, but has broader
implications for capital formation. As a long line of literature has noted, larger
agency costs lead to a higher cost of capital.3 35 Thus, to the extent that the Court's
robust corporate political speech jurisprudence has co-opted regulations that reflect
the efficient default rule of corporate ordering, this imposes costs, potentially very
high ones, on American capital formation through the corporate form.
Because the issue of non-shareholder agency costs in the firm's decision to
engage in CPA has not yet been studied, the volume and broader economic impact
of these agency costs are unclear. But based on the importance of creditor and
employee interests in and to the firm, and based on the potential size of the agency
conflicts involved, it seems likely that the impact on capital formation is large. One
set of evidence that may bear on this issue lies in a very new strand of research
purporting to identify a link between states' creditor-protective legal rules and
lower-cost debt funding.3 36 This line of research suggests that capital formation and
corporate funding costs are significantly affected by legal "default rules" that also
impact non-shareholder agency costs.
C. Non-Shareholder Agency Costs as a Rationale for Government Regulation
of CPA?
As described in Part I.D, Citizens United rejected the argument that shareholder
agency costs justified BRCA's limitations on corporate independent expenditures
on electioneering communications. This dismissal of the shareholder agency cost
problem was not, however, a rejection of agency costs as a rationale, but rather a
reflection of the Court's belief that existing "procedures of corporate democracy"
were sufficient to address these shareholder agency costs, thus obviating the claim
that this problem justified government regulation of speech.
Non-shareholder agency costs are also a pressing concern, arguably more so
than shareholder agency costs, and non-shareholders do not have access to the
procedures of corporate democracy. Moreover, as Parts III and IV lay out, the
available evidence suggests that neither corporate law nor private ordering
335. See, e.g., Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 14 (1989) (looking into the procyclicality of agency costs that occurs
due to the cyclical reliance on external financing and noting that this affects the costs of external
capital); Glenn Hubbard, Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 193 (1998)
(noting that information and incentive asymmetries influence the pricing of external investments);
Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (2000) (finding
that better information and stronger minority shareholder rights improve capital formation).
336. See Rock, supra note 98, at 1984 (citing Sattar A. Mansi et al., Creditor
Protection Laws and the Cost of Debt, 52 J.L. & ECON. 701, 716-18 & n.31 (2009) (finding that firms
incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions have better credit ratings and lower yield
spreads)); Yaxuan Qi & John Wald, State Laws & Debt Covenants, 51 J.L. & ECON. 179, 203 (2008)
(finding that firms incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions are less likely to include
creditor-protective debt covenants); John K. Wald & Michael S. Long, The Effect of State Laws on
Capital Structure, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 297, 315-16 (2007) (finding that U.S. manufacturing firms
incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions rely less on debt)).
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ameliorate this problem. The Court dismissed the problem of the "dissenting
shareholder," based on its claim that the dissenting shareholder could address any
agency problems through existing mechanisms. Such an assertion would not hold
true for the "dissenting creditor" or the "dissenting employee."
Given the high potential costs that CPA incurs for non-shareholders and the
broader economic impact that CPA has on capital formation, the government has a
strong policy interest in protecting the dissenting non-shareholder. It remains an
open question whether this interest, when balanced against the First Amendment
speech, petition, and association rights that the Court has articulated for corporate
political activity, is sufficient to justify government regulation. Based on the above
analysis, though, I would aver that the case for protecting the interests of the
dissenting non-shareholder is at least as strong as the case for protecting the
interests of the dissenting shareholder.
D. The Government as Corporate Stakeholder?
Finally, it is worth thinking about whether and to what extent the government
itself might utilize the mechanism of contractual covenant to limit the agency costs
of non-shareholders. Increasingly, the government has played a role as corporate
stakeholder, often as a creditor or third party insurer, with a direct pecuniary
interest in the firm. Could the government, in its role as investor or insurer,
negotiate for covenants that limit the corporation's ability to engage in CPA?
On the one hand, such a proposal seems quite attractive insofar as it can
eliminate the monitoring, freeriding, and collective action problems that would
likely prevent such covenants from being negotiated by private corporate
stakeholders, as described in Part IV. But such a proposal would also face steep
constitutional barriers, particularly with regard to the "unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine which, as Kathleen Sullivan has famously described, stands for the idea
that "the government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly."337 While
this doctrine is in considerable disarray, and legal scholars are in disagreement over
where it stands today,338 it is very possible that this doctrine remains coherent
enough to prevent the government from negotiating through contractual covenants
restrictions on corporate political "speech" that have otherwise been deemed
unconstitutional by Bellotti and Citizens United.
One potential glimmer of hope might be seen in the recent development of the
"government speech doctrine," which generally asserts that, while the government
may not restrict the free speech of private speakers, "the Government's own
speech ... is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny," even when that speech
337. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1415 (1989) (describing the problem of unconstitutional conditions and the Court's historical
approach to it).
338. See id. at 1416, 1417 (describing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as one
that is "riven with inconsistencies" and in "doctrinal disarray"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Why the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion,
Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990) (arguing that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is an "artifact" of an era preceding the modern regulatory state, and that it should be explicitly
abandoned).
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impacts private speech.339 As the Court recently stated in Walker v. Texas Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 34  when the "government speaks, it is not
barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.
That freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process that
first and foremost provides a check on government speech."
' 341
However, the government speech doctrine is quite nascent, with its origins
generally traced back to the 1991 Rust v. Sullivan decision.34 2 As a result, it is also
quite muddled as far as its breadth and its requirements.343 Indeed, as Justice Souter
advised in his concurring opinion in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, "it
would do well for us to go slow in setting its bounds, which will affect existing
doctrine in ways not yet explored.
'" 344
Thus, particularly given the strong articulation of First Amendment protections
for corporate political speech laid out in Citizens United, it seems quite possible,
perhaps even very likely, that PAR covenants negotiated by governmental actors
would be seen as violative of the First or Fourteenth Amendment under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Conclusion
Given the extraordinarily high potential costs that CPA can create for non-
shareholders, and the lack of viable options to reduce these agency costs, it is
surprising that this issue has not yet come to the fore. The justifications for the
status quo in corporate law and private ordering are unpersuasive for CPA. At the
same time, corporate law and private ordering do not provide adequate solutions for
the non-shareholder agency costs of CPA.
Because this issue has not yet been addressed in the literature, there is a dearth
of data and theoretical discussion on it. This Article does not intend to answer
every question or solve every aspect of the problems identified. Rather, I have tried
to articulate a framework that identifies the key issues in this regard. It is my hope
that this Article is the beginning of a long and productive dialogue that further
explores the contours of the non-shareholder agency problem arising from CPA.
Non-shareholder agency costs may prove to serve as a new and compelling
rationale for government regulation of CPA. Even if they do not, the above analysis
339. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005); see also
Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 695 (2011).
340. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
341. Id. at 2245 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68
(2009); Bd. of Regents of Univ. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).
342. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991) (holding that the government can
require doctors who belong to clinics receiving federal inds to follow certain guidelines, including
restrictions on the discussion of abortion, when counseling patients); see also Randall P. Bezanson, The
Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 809, 809 (2010) ("The government speech
doctrine began inauspiciously in Rust v. Sullivan.").
343. See Blocher, supra note 339, at 696-728 (describing the many conceptual
difficulties that the government speech doctrine raises that have yet to be resolved by the Court); Steven
H. Goldberg, The Government-Speech Doctrine: "'Recently Minted; " But Counterfeit, 49 U. LOUISVILLE
L. REV. 21, 23-24 (2010) (contending that the government speech doctrine is "counterfeit" and has
serious negative implications for the First Amendment).
344. 555 U.S. at 485 (Souter, J., concurring).
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suggests that, at a bare minimum, the Court's recent and robust assertion of
corporate political speech will likely have a deleterious impact on corporate capital
formation and should therefore be viewed as creating a large policy problem.

